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Weighted voting procedure having a unique blocker

Author

Listed:
  • Sanjay Bhattacherjee

    (Indian Statistical Institute
    University of Kent)

  • Palash Sarkar

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council of India has a non-conventional weighted voting procedure having a primary player who is a blocker and a set of secondary players. The voting weights are not fixed and are determined based on the subset of players which participate in the voting. We introduce the notion of voting schema to formally model such a voting procedure. Individual voting games arise from a voting schema depending on the subset of secondary players who participate in the voting. We make a detailed formal study of the trade-off between the minimal sizes of winning and blocking coalitions in the voting games that can arise from a voting schema. Finally, the GST voting procedure is assessed using the theoretical results leading to suggestions for improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanjay Bhattacherjee & Palash Sarkar, 2021. "Weighted voting procedure having a unique blocker," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 279-295, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00751-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00751-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, 2003. "Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 399-431, December.
    2. Laruelle,Annick & Valenciano,Federico, 2011. "Voting and Collective Decision-Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521182638, January.
    3. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489, March.
    4. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    5. Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S., 2009. "Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 428-444, November.
    6. William S. Zwicker, 2009. "Anonymous Voting Rules with Abstention: Weighted Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, pages 239-258, Springer.
    7. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 431-454, March.
    8. Chakravarty,Satya R. & Mitra,Manipushpak & Sarkar,Palash, 2015. "A Course on Cooperative Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107058798, January.
    9. Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel & Matthias Weber, 2014. "Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-058/I, Tinbergen Institute.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Goods and Services Tax (GST); GST Council; Voting schema; Weighted majority voting games; Winning and blocking coalition; Blocking power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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