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A market-based multi-agent system model for decentralized multi-project scheduling

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  • Giuseppe Confessore
  • Stefano Giordani
  • Silvia Rismondo

Abstract

We consider a multi-project scheduling problem, where each project is composed of a set of activities, with precedence relations, requiring specific amounts of local and shared (among projects) resources. The aim is to complete all the project activities, satisfying precedence and resource constraints, and minimizing each project schedule length. The decision making process is supposed to be decentralized, with as many local decision makers as the projects. A multi-agent system model, and an iterative combinatorial auction mechanism for the agent coordination are proposed. We provide a dynamic programming formulation for the combinatorial auction problem, and heuristic algorithms for both the combinatorial auction and the bidding process. An experimental analysis on the whole multi-agent system model is discussed. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Confessore & Stefano Giordani & Silvia Rismondo, 2007. "A market-based multi-agent system model for decentralized multi-project scheduling," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 115-135, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:150:y:2007:i:1:p:115-135:10.1007/s10479-006-0158-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-006-0158-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brucker, Peter & Drexl, Andreas & Mohring, Rolf & Neumann, Klaus & Pesch, Erwin, 1999. "Resource-constrained project scheduling: Notation, classification, models, and methods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 3-41, January.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    3. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. He, Yukang & Jia, Tao & Zheng, Weibo, 2023. "Tabu search for dedicated resource-constrained multiproject scheduling to minimise the maximal cash flow gap under uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 310(1), pages 34-52.
    2. Van Eynde, Rob & Vanhoucke, Mario, 2022. "New summary measures and datasets for the multi-project scheduling problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 299(3), pages 853-868.
    3. Adhau, Sunil & Mittal, M.L. & Mittal, Abhinav, 2013. "A multi-agent system for decentralized multi-project scheduling with resource transfers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 646-661.
    4. Fink, Andreas & Gerhards, Patrick, 2021. "Negotiation mechanisms for the multi-agent multi-mode resource investment problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 295(1), pages 261-274.
    5. Anıl Can & Gündüz Ulusoy, 2014. "Multi-project scheduling with two-stage decomposition," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 217(1), pages 95-116, June.
    6. Bredael, Dries & Vanhoucke, Mario, 2023. "Multi-project scheduling: A benchmark analysis of metaheuristic algorithms on various optimisation criteria and due dates," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 308(1), pages 54-75.
    7. Lang, Fabian & Fink, Andreas & Brandt, Tobias, 2016. "Design of automated negotiation mechanisms for decentralized heterogeneous machine scheduling," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(1), pages 192-203.
    8. Hartmann, Sönke & Briskorn, Dirk, 2008. "A survey of variants and extensions of the resource-constrained project scheduling problem," Working Paper Series 02/2008, Hamburg School of Business Administration (HSBA).
    9. Feifei Li & Zhe Xu, 2018. "A multi-agent system for distributed multi-project scheduling with two-stage decomposition," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(10), pages 1-24, October.
    10. Šůcha, Přemysl & Agnetis, Alessandro & Šidlovský, Marko & Briand, Cyril, 2021. "Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 294(1), pages 29-41.
    11. Alessandro Agnetis & Cyril Briand & Sandra Ulrich Ngueveu & Přemysl Šůcha, 2020. "Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 285(1), pages 97-119, February.
    12. Hartmann, Sönke & Briskorn, Dirk, 2010. "A survey of variants and extensions of the resource-constrained project scheduling problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(1), pages 1-14, November.
    13. Gómez Sánchez, Mariam & Lalla-Ruiz, Eduardo & Fernández Gil, Alejandro & Castro, Carlos & Voß, Stefan, 2023. "Resource-constrained multi-project scheduling problem: A survey," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(3), pages 958-976.
    14. Wuliang Peng & Jiali lin & Jingwen Zhang & Liangwei Chen, 2022. "A bi-objective hierarchical program scheduling problem and its solution based on NSGA-III," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 308(1), pages 389-414, January.
    15. Browning, Tyson R. & Yassine, Ali A., 2010. "Resource-constrained multi-project scheduling: Priority rule performance revisited," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 212-228, August.
    16. Rob Eynde & Mario Vanhoucke, 2020. "Resource-constrained multi-project scheduling: benchmark datasets and decoupled scheduling," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 301-325, June.
    17. He, Naihui & Zhang, David Z. & Yuce, Baris, 2022. "Integrated multi-project planning and scheduling - a multiagent approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 688-699.
    18. Rahman Torba & Stéphane Dauzère-Pérès & Claude Yugma & Cédric Gallais & Juliette Pouzet, 2024. "Solving a real-life multi-skill resource-constrained multi-project scheduling problem," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 338(1), pages 69-114, July.

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