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Identity, Interest And Emergent Rationality

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  • Michael W. Macy

Abstract

Identity and interest paradigms provide rival explanatory frameworks: One portrays group solidarity as the affirmation of cognitive categories, while the other looks for the incentives that motivate collective action among rational egoists. Neither is fully adequate. Identity theory emphasizes the cohesive effects of similarity but overlooks the causal importance of self-interest in a collective good. Interest theory emphasizes the solidary effects of interdependence but struggles to explain enthusiastic self-sacrifice and moral righteousness. I propose a synthetic reformulation of identity and interest, based on two corresponding strategies in the evolution of cooperation: kin and reciprocal altruism. This evolutionary approach, however, entails a fundamental rethinking of basic concepts in rational choice theory—a shift from `purposive' to `emergent' rationality.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael W. Macy, 1997. "Identity, Interest And Emergent Rationality," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(4), pages 427-448, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:427-448
    DOI: 10.1177/104346397009004003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas D. Heckathorn, 1989. "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 78-100, July.
    2. Jonathan Bendor, 1993. "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 709-734, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christina Fang & Steven Orla Kimbrough & Stefano Pace & Annapurna Valluri & Zhiqiang Zheng, 2002. "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 11(6), pages 449-467, November.

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