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The fragility of cooperation: A false feedback study of a sequential iterated prisoner's dilemma

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  • Monterosso, John
  • Ainslie, George
  • Pamela Toppi Mullen, P. A. -C.
  • Gault, Barbara

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  • Monterosso, John & Ainslie, George & Pamela Toppi Mullen, P. A. -C. & Gault, Barbara, 2002. "The fragility of cooperation: A false feedback study of a sequential iterated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 437-448, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:23:y:2002:i:4:p:437-448
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ido Erev & Amnon Rapoport, 1990. "Provision of Step-Level Public Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 401-425, September.
    2. Jonathan Bendor, 1993. "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 709-734, December.
    3. Jianzhong Wu & Robert Axelrod, 1995. "How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(1), pages 183-189, March.
    4. Robert Axelrod, 1980. "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 379-403, September.
    5. Stuart Oskamp, 1974. "Comparison of Sequential and Simultaneous Responding, Matrix, and Strategy Variables in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 18(1), pages 107-116, March.
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    1. Xu, Zhixiong & Xu, Zhehang & Zhang, Wei & Han, Xiao-Pu & Meng, Fanyuan, 2024. "Memory-based spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    2. István Back & Andreas Flache, 2006. "The Viability of Cooperation Based on Interpersonal Commitment," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12.
    3. Todd Guilfoos & Andreas Pape, 2016. "Predicting human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma using case-based decision theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 1-32, January.
    4. Michela Balconi & Laurent Pezard & Jean-Louis Nandrino & Maria Elide Vanutelli, 2017. "Two is better than one: The effects of strategic cooperation on intra- and inter-brain connectivity by fNIRS," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(11), pages 1-17, November.

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