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Collective Behavior Revisited

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  • ANDREW G. WALDER

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

Research on collective action has largely ignored the kinds of violent ideological movements that were a major preoccupation of earlier research on collective behavior. The models of mobilization that now dominate the field, designed to address the problem of free riders and individual choice in a relatively free political environment, offer little insight into the origins and development of such movements. The problem of individual choice and the aggregation of individual decisions into collective action remains a vital issue, however, and such concepts as dependence, monitoring capacity, and sanctions are essential to explanation. With an extended illustration of factional struggle and the mass victimization of suspected enemies of socialism during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, this article illustrates the ways in which these concepts can be refashioned to address a different class of collective action: movements in which no clear collective good is sought and in which the choices of individuals are highly circumscribed by political organizations and settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew G. Walder, 1994. "Collective Behavior Revisited," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(3), pages 400-421, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:400-421
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463194006003007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas D. Heckathorn, 1989. "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 78-100, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bai, Liang & Wu, Lingwei, 2020. "Political movement and trust formation: Evidence from the Cultural Revolution (1966–76)," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Erich Weede & Edward N. Muller, 1997. "Consequences Of Revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(3), pages 327-350, August.
    3. Kebin Deng & Zhong Ding & Yalu Wang, 2020. "Peasant youth experiences of CEOs, risk aversion and corporate performance," Rationality and Society, , vol. 32(3), pages 278-312, August.

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