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Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality

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  • Todd Sandler
  • Daniel G. Arce M.

Abstract

This paper utilizes benefit-cost duality to differentiate the problems associated with a pure public good from the problems associated with a commons. For the public good scenario, contributors’ benefits are public or available to all, while provision costs impact only the contributor. In a commons, crowding costs are public, while benefits affect only the user. Although both problems possess the same game form for their canonical representations, collective-action implications differ: for example, the relative positions of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum, the form of the exploitation hypothesis, and the need for selective incentives or punishments.

Suggested Citation

  • Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce M., 2003. "Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 355-368.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:79:y:2003:i:3:p:355-368
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Haynie, Alan C. & Hicks, Robert L. & Schnier, Kurt E., 2009. "Common property, information, and cooperation: Commercial fishing in the Bering Sea," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 406-413, December.
    2. Frank P. Maier-Rigaud & Jose Apesteguia, 2004. "The Role of Rivalry. Public Goods versus Common-Pool Resources," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_2, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    3. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2019. "The Role of Social and Technical Excludability for the Success of Impure Public Good and Common Pool Agreements: The Case of International Fisheries," Graz Economics Papers 2019-12, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    4. Barrero-Amórtegui, Yady & Maldonado, Jorge H., 2021. "Gender composition of management groups in a conservation agreement framework: Experimental evidence for mangrove use in the Colombian Pacific," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    5. Kate Ivanova, 2007. "Corruption, illegal trade and compliance with the Montreal Protocol," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(4), pages 475-496, December.
    6. Simon Vicary, 2009. "The voluntary provision of a public good in an international commons," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3), pages 984-996, August.
    7. Todd Sandler, 2015. "Collective action: fifty years later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 195-216, September.
    8. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    9. Jose Apesteguia & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 2006. "The Role of Rivalry," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(5), pages 646-663, October.
    10. Paul J. Ferraro & Michael K. Price, 2013. "Using Nonpecuniary Strategies to Influence Behavior: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(1), pages 64-73, March.
    11. Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2020. "The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    12. Daniel G. Arce, 2010. "Economics, Ethics and the Dilemma in the Prisoner's Dilemmas," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 55(1), pages 49-57, May.
    13. Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo & Gómez, Santiago & Mantilla, César, 2019. "Between-group competition enhances cooperation in resource appropriation games," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 17-26.
    14. Edgardo Barandiarán, 2003. "Protecting Property from Stationary Bandits," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 626-632.
    15. Bardhan, Pranab & Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2007. "Wealth inequality and collective action," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1843-1874, September.
    16. Osseni, Abdel Fawaz & Gohin, Alexandre & Rault, Arnaud, 2022. "Optimal Biosecurity Policy with Heterogeneous Farmers," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 47(2), May.
    17. Runge, C. Ford, 2004. "Sustainability And Enclosure: Land, Intellectual Property And Biotechnology," Working Papers 14464, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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