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When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?

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  • Keisuke Iida

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

Recent studies of uncertainty in international relations treat nation-states as unitary actors, but it may be more realistic to suppose that uncertainty also arises from domestic decision-making processes. By formalizing Putnam's theory of two-level games, this article attempts to integrate the studies of uncertainty and the “second image.†The distinction between domestic and international asymmetric information turns out to be subtle yet important. When there is complete information and international asymmetric information, domestic constraints may or may not enhance bargaining power; but they do not make successful ratification difficult. On the other hand, when there is incomplete domestic information, successful ratification is not guaranteed although the expected payoffs of the constrained negotiators may be still greater than without domestic constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Keisuke Iida, 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 403-426, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:37:y:1993:i:3:p:403-426
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037003001
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    2. Köke, Sonja & Lange, Andreas, 2017. "Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 90-106.
    3. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    4. Junk, Julian & Blatter, Joachim, 2010. "Transnational attention, domestic agenda-setting and international agreement: Modeling necessary and sufficient conditions for media-driven humanitarian interventions [Transnationale Aufmerksamkeit," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2010-301, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 1996. "Trade Negotiations, Information And Domestic Politics: The Role Of Domestic Groups," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 145-189, July.
    6. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "The logic of two-level games with endogenous lobbying: the case of international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05054, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    7. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
    8. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Hee Min Kim & Jun Choi, 2002. "Uncertainty in foreign policy making: A Bayesian game analysis of Korea," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 25-40.
    10. Simon Hug & Thomas König, 2007. "Domestic structures and constitution-building in an international organization: Introduction," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 105-113, June.
    11. Macartan Humphreys, 2007. "Strategic ratification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 191-208, July.

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