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Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD

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  • Powell, Robert

Abstract

Although incomplete information is recognized to be an essential feature of crises, game-theoretic formulations have not generally modeled this explicitly. This paper models a mutually assured destruction (MAD) crisis as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information, sufficiently simple that its equibria may be found. These provide better game-theoretic foundations for the notions of resolve and critical risk and their role in crises and also make it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics of this model with those of descriptively richer, but incompletely specified models, revealing several inconsistencies: several analyses of MAD conclude that the state with the greatest resolve in this contest of resolve will prevail. Many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate, the greater its adversary's resolve. In our model, however, the state with the weakest resolve sometimes prevails, and some states prove more likely to escalate if their adversaries' resolve is greater.

Suggested Citation

  • Powell, Robert, 1987. "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 717-735, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:03:p:717-735_20
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    Cited by:

    1. Randall W. Stone, 2001. "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 216-244, April.
    2. R. Harrison Wagner, 1992. "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 115-141, April.
    3. Frank C. Zagare, 2004. "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 107-141, April.
    4. Acharya, Avidit & Grillo, Edoardo, 2015. "War with Crazy Types," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 281-307, May.
    5. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Nuclear Weapons as Shields," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(3), pages 235-255, July.
    6. D. Marc Kilgour & Frank C. Zagare, 2007. "Explaining Limited Conflicts," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 65-82, February.
    7. HEIFETZ, Aviad & SEGEV, Ella, 2003. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Smith, Celina & Nordqvist, Mattias & De Massis, Alfredo & Miller, Danny, 2021. "When so much is at stake: Understanding organizational brinkmanship in family business," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4).
    9. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2016. "Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 461-496, July.
    10. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 520-534, August.
    11. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War," MPRA Paper 96071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Keisuke Nakao, 2022. "Denial and punishment in war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(2), pages 166-179, March.
    13. Lisa J. Carlson, 1995. "A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 511-534, September.
    14. Dong-Joon Jo & Erik Gartzke, 2007. "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 167-194, February.
    15. Hoffmann, Magnus, 2007. "The Social Benefit of War," MPRA Paper 6196, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2018. "Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 112-114.
    17. Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.
    18. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Winning with the Bomb," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 278-301, April.
    19. Patrick Hummel, 2015. "Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 288-300, April.
    20. Joshua D. Kertzer, 2017. "Microfoundations in international relations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 81-97, January.
    21. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2005. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 17-37, January.
    22. Shawn L. Ramirez, 2018. "Mediation in the shadow of an audience: How third parties use secrecy and agenda-setting to broker settlements," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 119-146, January.
    23. Kyungkook Kang & Jacek Kugler, 2015. "Assessment of deterrence and missile defense in East Asia: A power transition perspective," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 280-296, September.
    24. Keisuke Iida, 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 403-426, September.

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