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Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

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  • Alt, James E.
  • Calvert, Randall L.
  • Humes, Brian D.

Abstract

We develop and explicate a game-theoretic model in which repeated play, incomplete information, and reputation are major elements. A significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes. The model is used to formalize certain aspects of the “theory of hegemonic stability.” It shows that the “dilemma” or “limits” of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved, unifying both “benevolent” and “coercive” strands of hegemony theory. An example, drawn from recent developments in the Organization of Petroleum-exporting Countries, shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction. We conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

  • Alt, James E. & Calvert, Randall L. & Humes, Brian D., 1988. "Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 445-466, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:445-466_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Joe Clare & Vesna Danilovic, 2010. "Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in International Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(6), pages 860-882, December.
    2. Hausken, Kjell & Plümper, Thomas, 1996. "Hegemons, leaders and followers: A game-theoretic approach to the postwar dynamics of international political economy," MPIfG Discussion Paper 96/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    3. Nakao Keisuke, 2020. "Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(4), pages 1-20, December.
    4. Katsuzo Yamamoto, 2024. "A new formal model analysis of deterrent to brinkmanship and the causes of the armament dilemma," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(2), pages 132-155, April.
    5. James Meernik, 2011. "The Persistence of US Conflict Behavior: Continuity in the Use of Force," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 14(3), pages 33-60, September.
    6. Patrick James, 1999. "The Chain Store Paradox and Constitutional Politics in Canada," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(1), pages 5-36, January.
    7. R. Harrison Wagner, 1992. "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 115-141, April.
    8. Matt Malis & Alastair Smith, 2024. "Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-23, April.
    9. Acharya, Avidit & Grillo, Edoardo, 2015. "War with Crazy Types," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 281-307, May.
    10. Alexandra Guisinger & Alastair Smith, 2002. "Honest Threats," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(2), pages 175-200, April.
    11. Colgan, Jeff D., 2014. "The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 599-632, July.
    12. Sandra León, 2010. "The Political Rationale of Regional Financing in Spain," Chapters, in: Núria Bosch & Marta Espasa & Albert Solé Ollé (ed.), The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. George Tsebelis, 1990. "Are Sanctions Effective?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 3-28, March.
    14. Hee Min Kim & Jun Choi, 2002. "Uncertainty in foreign policy making: A Bayesian game analysis of Korea," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 25-40.
    15. Robert Pahre, 1994. "Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 326-352, June.
    16. Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.
    17. Zürn, Michael, 1992. "Interessen und Institutionen in der internationalen Politik: Grundlegung und Anwendungen des situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes," EconStor Books, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 112639, December.
    18. Nakao, Keisuke, 2013. "How Rebellion Expands? From Periphery to Heartland," MPRA Paper 50546, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Michael A. Allen, 2018. "The Influence of Regional Power Distributions on Interdependence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(5), pages 1072-1099, May.
    20. Douglas M. Gibler, 2008. "The Costs of Reneging," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(3), pages 426-454, June.
    21. Steven E. Lobell, 2004. "Politics and National Security: The Battles for Britain," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(4), pages 269-286, September.
    22. Paul A. Papayoanou, 1997. "Intra-Alliance Bargaining and U.S. Bosnia Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 91-116, February.
    23. Alastair Smith & Federico Varese, 2001. "Payment, Protection And Punishment," Rationality and Society, , vol. 13(3), pages 349-393, August.
    24. Keisuke Iida, 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 403-426, September.

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