IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v85y1991i03p727-749_17.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First

Author

Listed:
  • Wagner, R. Harrison

Abstract

I use the theory of games to investigate issues about how to understand the use of nuclear counterforce strategies by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The function of the counterforce strategies I model is not to enable a state confidently to launch a nuclear attack but to convince its adversary that the probability that it might do so as a last resort is greater than zero. The models allow one to investigate rational behavior when information is incomplete and there is an incentive to strike first, and therefore provide a way to explore controversies about the effect of counterforce strategies on both the credibility of extended deterrence and the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war. The models suggest, contrary to the claims of a number of writers, that the use of nuclear counterforce strategies is not necessarily inconsistent with rational behavior and provide some insight into the relation between counterforce strategies and brinkmanship models of deterrence.

Suggested Citation

  • Wagner, R. Harrison, 1991. "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 727-749, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:03:p:727-749_17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400179523/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.
    2. R. Harrison Wagner, 1992. "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 115-141, April.
    3. Christopher R. Dittmeier, 2013. "Proliferation, preemption, and intervention in the nuclearization of second-tier states," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(4), pages 492-525, October.
    4. Hughes, Michael S. & Lunday, Brian J., 2022. "The Weapon Target Assignment Problem: Rational Inference of Adversary Target Utility Valuations from Observed Solutions," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    5. Robert Rauchhaus, 2009. "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 258-277, April.
    6. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2016. "Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 461-496, July.
    7. Barry O'Neill, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: II," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 459-477, October.
    8. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War," MPRA Paper 96071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Michael Mandler and Michael Spagat, 2003. "Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/10, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003.
    10. Keisuke Nakao, 2022. "Denial and punishment in war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(2), pages 166-179, March.
    11. Mike Felgenhauer, 2007. "A sheriff, two bullets and three problems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 347-362, March.
    12. James D. Fearon, 1994. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 236-269, June.
    13. Keisuke Iida, 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 403-426, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:03:p:727-749_17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.