IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/compsc/v29y2012i1p28-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Does Democratic Accountability Shape International Cooperation?

Author

Listed:
  • Johannes Urpelainen

Abstract

In democratic societies, citizens can hold their government politically accountable for the consequences of international cooperation. Can democratic accountability shape international cooperation under strategic interdependence, and if so, to what effect? I show formally that citizens can endow a government with incentives to promote the public good by conditioning political support on the consequences of international cooperation. Contravening the conventional wisdom, democratic accountability effectively shapes international cooperation. Since international cooperation is reciprocal, domestic democratic accountability also influences the behavior of foreign governments, even if they are autocratic. Empirically, democratic accountability in one country increases the expected dyadic level of international cooperation if and only if the expected social benefits to that country are substantial enough. However, the analysis also reveals that democracies might sometimes obtain a higher payoff from cooperation with autocracies that do not have democratic accountability mechanisms. These findings indicate that the democratic propensity for international cooperation is a contingent phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "How Does Democratic Accountability Shape International Cooperation?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(1), pages 28-55, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:29:y:2012:i:1:p:28-55
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894211430278
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0738894211430278
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0738894211430278?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kyla Tienhaara, 2006. "What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the Environment in Developing Countries," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 73-100, November.
    2. Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2015. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Edward D Mansfield (ed.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 7, pages 127-143, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Ruggie, John Gerard, 1982. "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 379-415, April.
    4. Stasavage, David, 2004. "Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(4), pages 667-703, October.
    5. Weeks, Jessica L., 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 35-64, January.
    6. Esty, Daniel C., 2002. "The World Trade Organization's legitimacy crisis," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 7-22, March.
    7. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    8. Fearon, James D., 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 269-305, April.
    9. Lake, David A., 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(1), pages 24-37, March.
    10. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    11. Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2015. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Edward D Mansfield (ed.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 11, pages 227-263, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Kydd, Andrew, 2000. "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 325-357, April.
    13. Lupia,Arthur & McCubbins,Mathew D., 1998. "The Democratic Dilemma," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521585934, October.
    14. Mattli,Walter, 1999. "The Logic of Regional Integration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521635363, October.
    15. Milan Svolik, 2006. "Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(4), pages 909-925, October.
    16. McGillivray, Fiona & Smith, Alastair, 2000. "Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 809-824, October.
    17. Roland Vaubel, 1986. "A public choice approach to international organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 39-57, January.
    18. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    19. Lupia,Arthur & McCubbins,Mathew D., 1998. "The Democratic Dilemma," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521584487, October.
    20. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    21. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Morrow, James D. & Siverson, Randolph M. & Smith, Alastair, 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 791-807, December.
    22. Kono, Daniel Y., 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 369-384, August.
    23. Guisinger, Alexandra, 2009. "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 533-557, July.
    24. Grant, Ruth W. & Keohane, Robert O., 2005. "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 29-43, February.
    25. Lake, David A., 1996. "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 1-33, January.
    26. Mattli,Walter, 1999. "The Logic of Regional Integration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521632270, October.
    27. Erik Gartzke, 2007. "The Capitalist Peace," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 166-191, January.
    28. Keohane, Robert O., 1986. "Reciprocity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 1-27, January.
    29. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 761-799, October.
    30. Keohane, Robert O. & Macedo, Stephen & Moravcsik, Andrew, 2009. "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-31, January.
    31. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Smith, Alastair, 2009. "A Political Economy of Aid," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 309-340, April.
    32. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
    2. Terrence L Chapman & Johannes Urpelainen & Scott Wolford, 2013. "International bargaining, endogenous domestic constraints, and democratic accountability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 260-283, April.
    3. Jonas Tallberg & Thomas Sommerer & Theresa Squatrito, 2016. "Democratic memberships in international organizations: Sources of institutional design," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 59-87, March.
    4. Leonardo Baccini, 2010. "Explaining formation and design of EU trade agreements: The role of transparency and flexibility," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 195-217, June.
    5. Terrence L. Chapman, 2007. "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 134-166, February.
    6. Baccini, Leonardo, 2012. "Democratization and trade policy: an empirical analysis of developing countries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 44924, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Diana Panke, 2020. "Regional cooperation through the lenses of states: Why do states nurture regional integration?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 475-504, April.
    8. Adamson, Jordan, 2020. "Political institutions, resources, and war: Theory and evidence from ancient Rome," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    9. Li, Yuan & Gilli, Mario, 2014. "Accountability in Autocracies: The Role of Revolution Threat," Stockholm School of Economics Asia Working Paper Series 2014-30, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, revised 06 Mar 2014.
    10. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, 2015. "Delegation and pooling in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 305-328, September.
    11. Weinberg, Joe, 2018. "Where’s the Pork?: The Political Economy of the US Farm Bill," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 273867, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    12. Fiona McGillivray & Alastair Smith, 2005. "The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(5), pages 639-660, October.
    13. Daniel Yuichi Kono & Stephanie J. Rickard, 2014. "Buying National: Democracy, Public Procurement, and International Trade," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(5), pages 657-682, October.
    14. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(5), pages 690-713, October.
    15. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2009. "Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(5), pages 698-726, October.
    16. Fouad Pervez, 2015. "Waiting for election season," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 265-303, June.
    17. Baccini, Leonardo, 2010. "Explaining formation and design of EU trade agreements: the role of transparency and flexibility," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 45565, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Baccini, Leonardo & Dür, Andreas & Elsig, Manfred & Milewicz, Karolina, 2011. "The design of preferential trade agreements: A new dataset in the Making," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-10, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    19. Amy Pond, 2018. "Protecting Property: The Politics of Redistribution, Expropriation, and Market Openness," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 181-210, July.
    20. Jason S. Davis, 2022. "Screening for losers: Trade institutions and information," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-37, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:29:y:2012:i:1:p:28-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.