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Content
1999
1998
1997
1996
1992
1991
- 40 On rational Belief Equilibria
by Kurz, M.
- 39 On the Structure and Diversity of rational Beliefs
by Kurz, M.
- 37 Learning in an Equilibrium Search Model
by Dana, J.D.
- 33 Functional Fixed Points
by Vassilakis, S.
- 32 Rules for Changing the Rules
by Vassilakis, S.
- 30 The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
by Meyer, M.A.
- 29 Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
by Ma, C.A.
- 25 Strong Convergence of Recursive M-Estimators for Models with Dynamic Latent Variables
by Kuan, C.M. & White, H.
- 24 New Optimality Principles for Economic Efficiency and Equilibrium
by Luenberger, D.G.
- 11 Monotone Comparative Statics
by Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C.
- 10 Stability and Evolutionary Stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg-Mertens
by Swinkels, J.
- 9 Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants
by Swinkels, J.
1988