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Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation

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  • Kydd, Andrew

Abstract

Many scholars have argued that mistrust can prevent cooperation. These arguments often fail to adequately address the possibility that states can take steps to reassure each other, build trust, and thereby avoid conflict. I present a rational choice theory of reassurance focusing on costly signals and identify the conditions under which players can use costly signals to reassure the other side. The central result is that reassurance will be possible between trustworthy players in equilibrium if trustworthy actors are more willing to take risks to attain mutual cooperation than untrustworthy actors. I discuss the implications of the model in the context of the reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.

Suggested Citation

  • Kydd, Andrew, 2000. "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 325-357, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:54:y:2000:i:02:p:325-357_44
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    Cited by:

    1. Cali Mortenson Ellis & Michael C. Horowitz & Allan C. Stam, 2015. "Introducing the LEAD Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 718-741, August.
    2. Arne Schollaert & Dirk Van de gaer, 2008. "Boycotts, Power Politics, or Trust Building: How to Prevent Conflict?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(2), pages 356-379, June.
    3. Arfi, Badredine, 2007. "Quantum social game theory," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 374(2), pages 794-820.
    4. Alexandra Hennessy, 2017. "Good Samaritans vs. Hardliners: the Role of Credible Signalling in Greek Bailout Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 744-761, July.
    5. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism in international cooperation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 400-427, July.
    6. Badredine Arfi, 2006. "Linguistic Fuzzy-Logic Game Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(1), pages 28-57, February.
    7. Andrew Kydd, 2000. "Overcoming Mistrust," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(4), pages 397-424, November.
    8. Kyle Haynes & Brandon K. Yoder, 2024. "Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 26-46, January.
    9. Eric S. Dickson, 2006. "Rational Choice Epistemology and Belief Formation in Mass Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(4), pages 454-497, October.
    10. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2012. "Foundations of trust, interpersonal relationships and communities," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 120(3), pages 295-312.
    11. Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "How Does Democratic Accountability Shape International Cooperation?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(1), pages 28-55, February.
    12. Wakako Maekawa & Barış Arı & Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, 2019. "UN involvement and civil war peace agreement implementation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(3), pages 397-416, March.
    13. Amy Yuen, 2020. "Negotiating peacekeeping consent: Information and peace outcomes," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(2), pages 297-311, March.
    14. Andrew H. Kydd & Roseanne W. McManus, 2017. "Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 325-348, February.
    15. Kong, NGUYEN To Hong, 2021. "State-to-state Trust in Post-leadership Change: Case Study of China-Japan Relations, 2009-2019," OSF Preprints hdbcy, Center for Open Science.
    16. Christopher Marcoux & Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "Non-compliance by design: Moribund hard law in international institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 163-191, June.
    17. Takaaki Masaki & Bradley C. Parks, 2020. "When do performance assessments influence policy behavior? Micro-evidence from the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 371-408, April.
    18. repec:erp:kfgxxx:p0063 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Jeffrey T. Checkel & Andrew Moravcsik, 2001. "A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(2), pages 219-249, June.
    20. John P. Willerton & Gary Goertz & Michael O. Slobodchikoff, 2015. "Mistrust and hegemony: Regional institutional design, the FSU-CIS, and Russia," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 26-52, March.
    21. Anna K. Jarstad & Desiree Nilsson, 2008. "From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(3), pages 206-223, July.

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