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German Universities as State-sponsored Co-operatives

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  • Alexander Dilger

    (University of Münster, Faculty of Economics, Institute for Economic Education and Centrum for Management)

Abstract

Most universities in Germany are public firms but they have many properties of co-operatives. The most important thereof are described and analysed together with the characteristics of state-sponsorship. The real companions of the university as a co-operation are its professors. The same is true for the faculty level, perhaps even more so. However, especially the students are also organised in a co-operative form as are the representatives of all membership groups together. The state is making some crucial reforms that transform this university model or may even destroy it. In any case, the change is slow, painful and open-ended.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Dilger, 2007. "German Universities as State-sponsored Co-operatives," management revue. Socio-economic Studies, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 18(2), pages 102-116.
    • Handle: RePEc:rai:mamere:doi_10.1688/1861-9908_mrev_2007_02_dilger
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Estelle James & Egon Neuberger, 1981. "The university department as a non-profit labor cooperative," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 585-612, January.
    3. Edward L. Glaeser, 2003. "The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glae03-1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dilger, Alexander, 2017. "Sind gewählte Teamleiter besser als ihr Team? Analyse am Beispiel von BWL-Professoren und ihren Zitationen [Are elected team leaders better than their teams? Analysis at the example of management p," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 9/2017, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    2. Dilger, Alexander, 2013. "Vor- und Nachteile der W-Besoldung," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 5/2013, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    3. Dilger, Alexander, 2013. "Hochschulräte in NRW: Mehr Hochschulfreiheit oder Staatseinfluss?," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 4/2013, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    4. Dilger, Alexander, 2015. "Drittmittelorientierung als Risiko für Hochschulen," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 12/2015, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    5. Dilger, Alexander, 2011. "Besonderheiten der Bewerbung um Promotionsstellen und -gelegenheiten," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 11/2011, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Co-operative; Incentive; Professor; Reform; Tenure; University;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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