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A theoretical framework for incentives in the public sector

Author

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  • Laurent Franckx

    (Royal Military Academy of Belgium)

  • Isabelle Brose

    (Royal Military Academy of Belgium)

Abstract

This note considers the provision of incentives in public organizations that face the following three constraints. First, no lateral entry is possible. Second, the outside opportunities of bureaucrats are independent of their performance. Third, the organization cannot design incentive schemes with stochastic wage bills. In our incentive scheme., the organization contains three jobs. Every period, the organization recruits two agents for the ``field" jobs. At the end of the period, one agent is put in retirement and the other is promoted to the ``executive" job. An agent will be promoted if he has obtained the highest performance on the managerial aspects of the ``field" job, and has passed an endogenous standard of performance on the technical aspects of this ``field" job. This system (1) provides incentives for optimal efforts in the ``field" job AND (2) improves on a purely random allocation system of the “executive”. There are problems of time consistency, though.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "A theoretical framework for incentives in the public sector," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04j40002
    as

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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