The impact of performance measurement and reward systems on work behaviour, motivation and performance: Qualitative study
[Vliv systému měření výkonnosti a odměňování na pracovní chování, motivaci a výkonnost: Kvalitativní studie]
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DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.568
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More about this item
Keywords
Performance measurement; Performance management; Reward system; Motivation; Pay for performance; Měření výkonnosti; Řízení výkonnosti; Odměňování; Motivace; Odměny dle výkonnosti;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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