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Do intrinsic and extrinsic motivation relate differently to employee outcomes?

Author

Listed:
  • Kuvaas, Bård
  • Buch, Robert
  • Weibel, Antoinette
  • Dysvik, Anders
  • Nerstad, Christina G.L.

Abstract

In most theories that address how individual financial incentives affect work performance, researchers have assumed that two types of motivation—intrinsic and extrinsic—mediate the relationship between incentives and performance. Empirically, however, extrinsic motivation is rarely investigated. To explore the predictive validity of these theories of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in work settings, we tested how both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation affected supervisor-rated work performance, affective and continuance commitment, turnover intention, burnout, and work–family conflict. In the course of three studies (two cross-sectional and one cross-lagged) across different industries, we found that intrinsic motivation was associated with positive outcomes and that extrinsic motivation was negatively related or unrelated to positive outcomes. In addition, intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation were moderately negatively correlated in all three studies. We also discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the study and directions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Kuvaas, Bård & Buch, Robert & Weibel, Antoinette & Dysvik, Anders & Nerstad, Christina G.L., 2017. "Do intrinsic and extrinsic motivation relate differently to employee outcomes?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 244-258.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:61:y:2017:i:c:p:244-258
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.05.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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