IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/ijodag/v21y2024i3d10.1057_s41310-023-00203-6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Systematic review in financialization politics: the role of corporate governance and managerial compensation

Author

Listed:
  • Rita Vieira

    (Research Centre on Accounting and Taxation (CICF/IPCA)
    University of Aveiro)

  • Graça Azevedo

    (Research Centre on Accounting and Taxation (CICF/IPCA)
    University of Aveiro)

  • Jonas Oliveira

    (ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa
    BRU-ISCTE - Business Research Centre)

Abstract

This review seeks to synthesize empirical findings on financialization policies and provide answers to two questions: (1) What relationship exists between Financialization and Corporate Governance? (2) Is there any relationship between financialization and CEO compensation/remuneration systems? A group of 38 scientific articles was selected using the methodological protocols ProKnow-C and Methodi Ordinatio. Based on its reading, analysis, and synthesis of the main empirical findings between financialization and the accumulation of capital and between financialization and income distribution, it is evident that there is a negative correlation between this phenomenon and the investment in means of production and the proportion of income from labour. We hope that this work can contribute to a rethinking of the income redistribution model (internationally), as the current model has contributed to an increase in the unequal distribution of social wealth, which is characterized primarily by the excessive compensation of top executives who prioritize short-term goals. We hope that it can also serve as a foundation for future scientific work and as a resource not only for regulatory agencies but also for government entities that must make political, economic, and fiscal decisions to mitigate or even reverse the global effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Rita Vieira & Graça Azevedo & Jonas Oliveira, 2024. "Systematic review in financialization politics: the role of corporate governance and managerial compensation," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(3), pages 376-405, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:ijodag:v:21:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1057_s41310-023-00203-6
    DOI: 10.1057/s41310-023-00203-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41310-023-00203-6
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1057/s41310-023-00203-6?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brett Fiebiger, 2016. "Rethinking the Financialisation of Non-Financial Corporations: A Reappraisal of US Empirical Data," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 354-379, July.
    2. Karsten Kohler & Alexander Guschanski & Engelbert Stockhammer, 2019. "The impact of financialisation on the wage share: a theoretical clarification and empirical test," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 43(4), pages 937-974.
    3. Burns, Natasha & Kedia, Simi, 2006. "The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 35-67, January.
    4. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    5. James Crotty, 2003. "The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact of Destructive Product Market Competition and Impatient Finance on Nonfinancial Corporations in the Neoliberal Era," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 271-279, September.
    6. William Milberg & Deborah Winkler, 2010. "Financialisation and the dynamics of offshoring in the USA," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 34(2), pages 275-293, March.
    7. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 32-42, January.
    8. Mellahi, Kamel & Collings, David G., 2010. "The barriers to effective global talent management: The example of corporate élites in MNEs," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 143-149, April.
    9. Ronald Dore, 2008. "Financialization of the global economy," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 17(6), pages 1097-1112, December.
    10. Ozgür Orhangazi, 2008. "Financialisation and capital accumulation in the non-financial corporate sector:," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 32(6), pages 863-886, November.
    11. Clarke, Thomas & Jarvis, Walter & Gholamshahi, Soheyla, 2019. "The impact of corporate governance on compounding inequality: Maximising shareholder value and inflating executive pay," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    13. Hwan Joo Seo & Sung Jin Kang & Yong Jun Baek, 2020. "Managerial myopia and short-termism of innovation strategy: Financialisation of Korean firms," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 44(6), pages 1197-1220.
    14. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, April.
    15. Anat R. Admati, 2017. "A Skeptical View of Financialized Corporate Governance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 131-150, Summer.
    16. Taekjin Shin, 2012. "CEO Compensation and Shareholder Value Orientation Among Large US Firms," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 43(4), pages 535-559.
    17. William Lazonick, 2016. "The Value-Extracting CEO: How Executive Stock-Based Pay Undermines Investment in Productive Capabilities," Working Papers Series 54, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    18. Ken-Hou Lin, 2016. "The Rise of Finance and Firm Employment Dynamics," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(4), pages 972-988, August.
    19. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-714, May.
    20. Yermack, David, 1997. "Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 449-476, June.
    21. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
    22. Conyon, Martin J & Leech, Dennis, 1994. "Top Pay, Company Performance and Corporate Governance," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 56(3), pages 229-247, August.
    23. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    24. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 2000. "The End Of History For Corporate Law," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm136, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2001.
    25. Thomas I. Palley, 2013. "Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Financialization, chapter 2, pages 17-40, Palgrave Macmillan.
    26. Paul Gregg & Stephen Machin & Stefan Szymanski, 1993. "The Disappearing Relationship Between Directors' Pay and Corporate Performance," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 31(1), pages 1-9, March.
    27. Engelbert Stockhammer, 2004. "Financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 28(5), pages 719-741, September.
    28. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    29. Khim Ong Kelly, 2007. "Feedback and Incentives on Nonfinancial Value Drivers: Effects on Managerial Decision Making," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(2), pages 523-556, June.
    30. Claudio Loderer & Urs Peyer, 2002. "Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 8(2), pages 165-192, June.
    31. Eckhard Hein, 2015. "Finance-dominated capitalism and re-distribution of income: a Kaleckian perspective," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 39(3), pages 907-934.
    32. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    33. Denis, Diane K. & McConnell, John J., 2003. "International Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-36, March.
    34. Jacek Wallusch & Beata Woźniak-Jęchorek & Sławomir Kuźmar, 2020. "Aggregate and regional effects of financialisation in CEE countries," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(7), pages 860-876, October.
    35. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    36. James Crotty, 2009. "Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the 'new financial architecture'," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 33(4), pages 563-580, July.
    37. Yasmine Chahed, 2021. "Words and Numbers: Financialization and Accounting Standard‐Setting in the United Kingdom," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 302-337, March.
    38. Matthieu Montalban & Mustafa Erdem Sakinç, 2013. "Financialization and productive models in the pharmaceutical industry," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 22(4), pages 981-1030, August.
    39. Ricardo Barradas, 2019. "Financialization and Neoliberalism and the Fall in the Labor Share: A Panel Data Econometric Analysis for the European Union Countries," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 51(3), pages 383-417, September.
    40. Engelbert Stockhammer, 2005. "Shareholder value orientation and the investment-profit puzzle," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(2), pages 193-215.
    41. Marcelo do Carmo & Mario Sacomano Neto & Julio Cesar Donadone, 2019. "Financialization in the Automotive Industry: Shareholders, Managers, and Salaries," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(3), pages 841-862, July.
    42. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    43. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
    44. Ozkan, Neslihan, 2007. "Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 349-364, December.
    45. Hahn, Katrin, 2019. "Innovation in times of financialization: Do future-oriented innovation strategies suffer? Examples from German industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 923-935.
    46. Regina Negri Pagani & João Luiz Kovaleski & Luis Mauricio Resende, 2015. "Methodi Ordinatio: a proposed methodology to select and rank relevant scientific papers encompassing the impact factor, number of citation, and year of publication," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 105(3), pages 2109-2135, December.
    47. Samuel Knafo & Sahil Jai Dutta, 2020. "The myth of the shareholder revolution and the financialization of the firm," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 476-499, May.
    48. Zhang, Ying & Andrew, Jane, 2014. "Financialisation and the Conceptual Framework," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 17-26.
    49. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    50. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    51. Young Soo Lee & Han Sung Kim & Seo Hwan Joo, 2020. "Financialization and Innovation Short-termism in OECD Countries," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 259-286, June.
    52. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    53. Daniele Tori & Özlem Onaran, 2018. "The effects of financialization on investment: evidence from firm-level data for the UK," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 42(5), pages 1393-1416.
    54. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    55. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    56. Akira Matsumoto, 2020. "Considerations on Inequality, Corporate Governance, and Financialization," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(2), pages 334-340, April.
    57. Thomas Gstraunthaler & János Lukács & Marcel Steller, 2008. "The Board of Directors and its Role in the Corporate Governance System - Considerations about the Control Model - A Research Note," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH), Kavala Campus, Greece, vol. 1(1), pages 37-54, April.
    58. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    59. Elaine Aparecida Regiani Campos & Regina Negri Pagani & Luis Mauricio Resende & Joseane Pontes, 2018. "Construction and qualitative assessment of a bibliographic portfolio using the methodology Methodi Ordinatio," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 116(2), pages 815-842, August.
    60. Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, 2004. "Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective Revisited”: A Reply," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(3), pages 370-371, June.
    61. Lewellen, Wilbur & Loderer, Claudio & Martin, Kenneth, 1987. "Executive compensation and executive incentive problems : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 287-310, December.
    62. Engelbert Stockhammer, 2010. "Financialization and the Global Economy," Working Papers wp240, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    63. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 2000. "The End Of History For Corporate Law," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm136, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2001.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joel Rabinovich & Niall Reddy, 2024. "Corporate Financialization: A Conceptual Clarification and Critical Review of the Literature," Working Papers PKWP2402, Post Keynesian Economics Society (PKES).
    2. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    3. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
    4. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. ATM Adnan & Nisar Ahmed, 2019. "The Transformation Of The Corporate Governance Model: A Literature Review," Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 8(3), pages 7-47.
    6. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, March.
    7. Dietl Helmut M & Duschl Tobias & Lang Markus, 2011. "Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-32, August.
    8. Ming‐Yuan Chen, 2010. "The Components Of Managerial Pay Adjustments And Their Impact On Firm Performance," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(6), pages 582-608, December.
    9. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    10. Sualihu, Mohammed Aminu & Rankin, Michaela & Haman, Janto, 2021. "The role of equity compensation in reducing inefficient investment in labor," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    11. Page, T. Beau, 2018. "CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(2), pages 378-401.
    12. Timothy Fogarty & Michel Magnan & Garen Markarian & Serge Bohdjalian, 2009. "Inside Agency: The Rise and Fall of Nortel," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 84(2), pages 165-187, January.
    13. Sun, Liang, 2021. "Does the location of directors' additional positions matter? A new dimension of board structure," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    14. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    16. Shromona Ganguly, 2021. "Financialization of the Real Economy: New Empirical Evidence from the Non-financial Firms in India Using Conditional Logistic Model," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 19(3), pages 493-523, September.
    17. Wei Zhang & Steven F. Cahan, 2010. "Nonrecurring Accounting Transactions and Stock Option Grants," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1-2), pages 93-129.
    18. Kou, Zonglai & Tang, Yue & Wu, Hong & Zhou, Min, 2023. "Ownership, volatility, and equity incentives: Theory and evidence from listed companies in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    19. Butzbach Olivier & von Mettenheim Kurt E., 2015. "Alternative Banking and Theory," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 105-171, July.
    20. Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Sheeba Kapil & Rakesh K Mishra, 2019. "Corporate Governance structure and firm performance in Indian context: A Structural Equation Modelling Approach," Working Papers 1937, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:ijodag:v:21:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1057_s41310-023-00203-6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.