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Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation

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  • Jared Harris

    (Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Virginia, P.O. Box 6550, Charlottesville, Virginia 22906-6550)

  • Philip Bromiley

    (Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92697-3125)

Abstract

Despite the many undesirable outcomes of corporate misconduct, scholars have an inadequate understanding of corporate misconduct’s causes and mechanisms. We extend the behavioral theory of the firm, which traditionally assumes away the possibility of firm impropriety, to develop hypotheses predicting that top management incentive compensation and poor organizational performance relative to aspirations increase the likelihood of financial misrepresentation. Using a sample of financial restatements prompted by accounting irregularities and identified by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, we find empirical support for both incentive and relative performance influences on financial statement misrepresentation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jared Harris & Philip Bromiley, 2007. "Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 350-367, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:18:y:2007:i:3:p:350-367
    DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1060.0241
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