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The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting

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  • Burns, Natasha
  • Kedia, Simi

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  • Burns, Natasha & Kedia, Simi, 2006. "The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 35-67, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:79:y:2006:i:1:p:35-67
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    16. Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, March.
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