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Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay

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  • Daniel Houser
  • John Wooders

Abstract

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Houser & John Wooders, 2006. "Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 353-369, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:15:y:2006:i:2:p:353-369
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x
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