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Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models

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  • Cohen, Linda

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  • Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:20:y:1979:i:1:p:1-12
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 88-105, March.
    2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1999. "Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 663-672.
    4. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-00597200, HAL.
    5. Vincent Anesi, 2006. "Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 595-610, December.
    6. Scott E. Page, 1991. "Simulations and Spatial Voting Methods," Discussion Papers 952, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 1985. "The politics of flatland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 45-60, January.
    8. Tyler Cowen & Amihai Glazer & Henry McMillan, 1994. "Rent Seeking Can Promote The Provision Of Public Goods," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 131-145, July.
    9. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    10. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. James Enelow & Melvin Hinisch, 1983. "On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 317-321, January.
    13. Jeffrey Weiss, 1988. "Is vote-selling desirable?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 177-194, November.
    14. Norman Schofield, 1995. "Coalition Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 245-281, July.
    15. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," SciencePo Working papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    16. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.
    18. John Goodman & Philip Porter, 1988. "Theory of competitive regulatory equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 51-66, October.
    19. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01065004, HAL.
    20. Knudson, Mathew, 2020. "Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 413-434.
    21. Itai Sened, 1991. "Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(4), pages 379-402, October.
    22. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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