Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan & Michel LeBreton, "undated". "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
References listed on IDEAS
- D. Pearce, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 523, David K. Levine.
- Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
- Dutta, Bhaskar, 1988. "Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 63-80, February.
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
- D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
- D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
- Donald G. Saari, 1997. "The generic existence of a core for q -rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 219-260.
- David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1999.
"Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 663-672.
- David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cycling of Simple Rules in the Spatial Model," Discussion Papers 1246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Georges Bordes & Michel Le Breton & Maurice Salles, 1992. "Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 509-518, August.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-Francois Laslier, 1999.
"Comparison functions and choice correspondences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 513-532.
- B. Dutta & J-F. Laslier, 1998. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences," THEMA Working Papers 98-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
- Maxwell B. Stinchcombe & Halbert White, 1992. "Some Measurability Results for Extrema of Random Functions Over Random Sets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 495-514.
- Michel Le Breton & John Duggan, 2001.
"Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 65-78.
- DUGGAN, John & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Mixed refinements of Shapley’s saddles and weak tournaments," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987.
"Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-933, July.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Schofield, Norman., 1985. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point," Working Papers 552, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
- Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
- Laffond G. & Laslier J. F. & Le Breton M., 1993. "The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 182-201, January.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 511-514, March.
- Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
- Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125, Elsevier.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2006.
"Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 194-234, January.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2003. "Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model," IDEI Working Papers 188, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008.
"A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.
- John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Wallis Working Papers WP53, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Norman Schofield, 2015. "Climate Change, Collapse and Social Choice Theory," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 007-035, October.
- Crès, Hervé & Utku Ünver, M., 2017. "Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 145-149.
- Itai Sened, 1991. "Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(4), pages 379-402, October.
- De Donder, Philippe & Gallego, Maria, 2017. "Electoral Competition and Party Positioning," TSE Working Papers 17-760, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- B. D. Bernheim & S. N. Slavov, 2009.
"A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2007. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Discussion Papers 07-029, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Norman Schofield, 2007. "Modelling Politics," ICER Working Papers 33-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur, 2016. "Formal versus informal legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 1-17.
- Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
- Vincent Anesi, 2012.
"A new old solution for weak tournaments,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 919-930, October.
- Vincent Anesi, 2010. "A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments," Discussion Papers 2010-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi, 2010. "A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments," Discussion Papers 2010-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
- Myerson, Roger B., 2013.
"Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(3), pages 305-337, June.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1996. "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory," Discussion Papers 1162, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Daniel Diermeier & Keith Krehbiel, 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 123-144, April.
- Gallego, Maria & Schofield, Norman, 2017. "Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 160-181.
- Norman Schofield, 1995. "Coalition Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 245-281, July.
- John Duggan, 2013. "Uncovered sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 489-535, September.
- Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.
- Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2010.
"The Condorcet Paradox Revisited,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
10-026/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H, 2010. "The Condercet paradox revisited," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H, 2013. "The Condorcet paradox revisited," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:88-105. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.