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Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections

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  • van Deemen, Adrian M A
  • Vergunst, Noel P

Abstract

In this paper, the authors analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989, and 1994 in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, they investigate these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • van Deemen, Adrian M A & Vergunst, Noel P, 1998. "Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 475-490, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:97:y:1998:i:3:p:475-90
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    Cited by:

    1. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2018. "Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-35.
    2. Peeters, Marga, 2010. "Parliamentary election outcomes in the Netherlands during 1981-2010: Have they become more determined by regional than national (economic) performance?," MPRA Paper 24827, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-145, April.
    4. Richard Potthoff, 2013. "Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 101-122, January.
    5. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
    6. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter & Duminski, Emily & Horndrup, Søren Nikolai, 2023. "Demokratiets vilkårlighed: En analyse af forekomsten af valgparadokser ved tre folketingsvalg [The arbitrariness of democracy: An analysis of the occurrence of voting paradoxes in three Danish parl," MPRA Paper 118922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
    8. Marek M. Kaminski, 2015. "Empirical examples of voting paradoxes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 20, pages 367-387, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Malthe Munkøe, 2014. "Cycles and instability in politics. Evidence from the 2009 Danish municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 383-397, March.
    10. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
    11. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2011. "Election inversions, coalitions and proportional representation: Examples from Danish elections," MPRA Paper 35302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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