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Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences

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  • William Gehrlein

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  • William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:52:y:2002:i:2:p:171-199
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1015551010381
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
    2. van Deemen, Adrian M A & Vergunst, Noel P, 1998. "Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 475-490, December.
    3. Gehrlein, William V., 2001. "Condorcet winners on four candidates with anonymous voters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 335-340, June.
    4. Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-1067, November.
    5. Stensholt, Eivind, 1999. "Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 45-57, January.
    6. Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
    7. Riker, William H., 1958. "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 349-366, June.
    8. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-145, April.
    9. Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V. & Maskin, Eric, 1979. "A progress report on Kelly's majority conjectures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 313-314.
    10. Kenneth J. Arrow & Herve Raynaud, 1986. "Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262511754, April.
    11. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1997. "Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 85-89, August.
    12. Kelly, Jerry S, 1974. "Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(2), pages 239-251, March.
    13. Gehrlein, William V., 1981. "The expected probability of Condorcet's paradox," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 33-37.
    14. Rae, Douglas, 1980. "An Altimeter for Mr. Escher's Stairway: A Comment on William H. Riker's “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions”," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 451-455, June.
    15. Miller, Nicholas R., 1983. "Pluralism and Social Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 734-747, September.
    16. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    17. Sven Berg & Bo Bjurulf, 1983. "A note on the paradox of voting: Anonymous preference profiles and May's formula," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 307-316, January.
    18. Truchon, M., 1998. "Figure Skating and the Theory of Social Choice," Papers 9814, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
    19. Riker, William H., 1961. "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 900-911, December.
    20. Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1976. "The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 14-25, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
    2. Lehtinen, Aki, 2006. "Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 50(9), pages 2495-2507, May.
    3. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
    4. Lachowicz, Mirosław & Matusik, Milena & Topolski, Krzysztof A., 2024. "Population of entities with three individual states and asymmetric interactions," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 464(C).
    5. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    6. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2022. "The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 427-447, October.
    7. Salvatore Barbaro & Nils D. Steiner, 2022. "Majority principle and indeterminacy in German elections," Working Papers 2202, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    8. William Gehrlein, 2007. "Coincidence of Agreement between Probabilistic and Algebraic Choosers," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 461-487, June.
    9. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, August.
    10. Thomas Ratliff & Donald Saari, 2014. "Complexities of electing diverse committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 55-71, June.
    11. Tigran Melkonyan & Zvi Safra, 2016. "Intrinsic Variability in Group and Individual Decision Making," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(9), pages 2651-2667, September.
    12. Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt & Christian Stricker, 2022. "An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 5-38, January.
    13. Robi Ragan, 2015. "Computational social choice," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 5, pages 67-80, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Donald G. Saari, 2015. "Voting mysteries: a picture is worth a thousand words," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 16, pages 284-302, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Lisa Sauermann, 2022. "On the probability of a Condorcet winner among a large number of alternatives," Papers 2203.13713, arXiv.org.
    16. Harrie Swart, 2022. "How to Choose a President, Mayor, Chair: Balinski and Laraki Unpacked," The Mathematical Intelligencer, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 99-107, June.
    17. Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter, 2007. "Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(4), pages 857-872, November.
    18. Dougherty, Keith L. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2020. "The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    19. Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
    20. Gehrlein, William V., 2004. "The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 69-85, January.
    21. Marie-Louise Lackner & Martin Lackner, 2017. "On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 717-745, April.
    22. Tanguiane, Andranick S., 2022. "Analysis of the 2021 Bundestag elections. 2/4. Political spectrum," Working Paper Series in Economics 152, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

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