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The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters

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  • Gehrlein, William V.
  • Lepelley, Dominique

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  • Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2001. "The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 39-50, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:41:y:2001:i:1:p:39-50
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stensholt, Eivind, 1999. "Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 45-57, January.
    2. Barnett,William A. & Moulin,Hervé & Salles,Maurice & Schofield,Norman J. (ed.), 1995. "Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443401, September.
    3. Sven Berg & Bo Bjurulf, 1983. "A note on the paradox of voting: Anonymous preference profiles and May's formula," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 307-316, January.
    4. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
    5. Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
    6. Van Newenhizen, Jill, 1992. "The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 69-83, January.
    7. Gehrlein, William V., 1982. "Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 123-130, March.
    8. Kuga, Kiyoshi & Nagatani, Hiroaki, 1974. "Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1045-1067, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    2. Erik Friese & William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Achill Schürmann, 2017. "The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(6), pages 2793-2812, November.
    3. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    4. Gehrlein, William V. & Moyouwou, Issofa & Lepelley, Dominique, 2013. "The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 352-365.
    5. William Gehrlein, 2006. "The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 191-208, January.
    6. Raúl Pérez-Fernández & Bernard De Baets, 2019. "The superdominance relation, the positional winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 46-65, January.
    7. McIntee, Tomas J. & Saari, Donald G., 2017. "Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 1-10.
    8. Kangas, Annika & Laukkanen, Sanna & Kangas, Jyrki, 2006. "Social choice theory and its applications in sustainable forest management--a review," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 77-92, November.
    9. Lepelley, Dominique & Gehrlein, William V., 2000. "Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 157-164, August.
    10. Gehrlein, William V., 2004. "The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 69-85, January.
    11. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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