IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/15584_5.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Computational social choice

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Robi Ragan

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Suggested Citation

  • Robi Ragan, 2015. "Computational social choice," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 5, pages 67-80, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781783470723.00010.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
    2. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 2012. "Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 83-95, July.
    3. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(3), pages 339-356.
    4. Keith Dougherty & Brian Pitts & Justin Moeller & Robi Ragan, 2014. "An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 359-382, March.
    5. Julian H. Blau, 1975. "Liberal Values and Independence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(3), pages 395-401.
    6. Tesfatsion, Leigh & Judd, Kenneth L., 2006. "Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol. 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10368, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    8. Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Computational Economics," Handbook of Computational Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    9. Cross,John G., 2008. "A Theory of Adaptive Economic Behavior," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521067119, September.
    10. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "A finite exact algorithm for epsilon-core membership in two dimensions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 178-180, November.
    11. Klahr, David, 1966. "A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 384-390, June.
    12. Young, H. P., 1977. "Extending Condorcet's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 335-353, December.
    13. Laver, Michael, 2005. "Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(2), pages 263-281, May.
    14. Koehler, David H., 2001. "Convergence and Restricted Preference Maximizing under Simple Majority Rule: Results from a Computer Simulation of Committee Choice in Two-Dimensional Space," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(1), pages 155-167, March.
    15. Judd, Kenneth L., 2006. "Computationally Intensive Analyses in Economics," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 17, pages 881-893, Elsevier.
    16. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    17. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    18. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    19. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    20. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    21. Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2012. "Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 655-678, June.
    22. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2022. "The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 427-447, October.
    2. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
    3. Krishna K Ladha, 2012. "Aristotle’s Politics: On Constitutions, Justice, Laws and Stability," Working papers 104, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode.
    4. Richiardi Matteo G, 2009. "Should (and Could) We Ban Prescriptions?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-28, January.
    5. Kotaro Suzumura, 2002. "Introduction to social choice and welfare," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 442, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2019. "A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 145-164, April.
    7. Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman, 2017. "Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-17, October.
    8. Thomas Bräuninger, 2007. "Stability in Spatial Voting Games with Restricted Preference Maximizing," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 173-191, April.
    9. John Craven, 2023. "Self-designation and group allocation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 121-133, January.
    10. Salvador Barberà, 2003. "A Theorem on Preference Aggregation," Working Papers 166, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Pär Torstensson, 2008. "Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, February.
    12. Sato, Shin, 2013. "A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 259-278.
    13. Paul Brewer & Jeremy Juybari & Raymond Moberly, 2024. "A comparison of zero- and minimal-intelligence agendas in majority-rule voting models," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 19(3), pages 403-437, July.
    14. Mathieu Martin & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Ashley Piggins & Élise F. Tchouante, 2022. "Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 301-316, March.
    15. Nan Lu, 2018. "La modélisation de l’indice CAC 40 avec un modèle basé agent," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph18-02 edited by François Legendre.
    16. Yi, Jianxin & Li, Yong, 2016. "A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 79-86.
    17. Berghammer, Rudolf & Schnoor, Henning, 2015. "Control of Condorcet voting: Complexity and a Relation-Algebraic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 246(2), pages 505-516.
    18. Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2011. "The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 683-706, October.
    19. Iain McLean, 2015. "The strange history of social choice, and the contribution of the Public Choice Society to its fifth revival," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 153-165, April.
    20. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.