Consistency in Measures of Social Homogeneity: A Connection with Proximity to Single Peaked Preferences
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DOI: 10.1023/B:QUQU.0000019391.85976.65
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Cited by:
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008.
"On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006. "On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2007. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Post-Print hal-01245310, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa, 2019.
"On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
- Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Post-Print hal-01786590, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes, 2017.
"Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 375-395.
- Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes, 2017. "Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited," Post-Print hal-01631180, HAL.
- William Gehrlein, 2011. "Strong measures of group coherence and the probability that a pairwise majority rule winner exists," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 365-374, February.
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