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How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)

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  • Andrew T. Young

    (Texas Tech University)

Abstract

Will a society’s political agents provide good governance? An answer must be sought first and foremost at the constitutional level. While Austrians have made important contributions to constitutional political economy (CPE), they have often avoided interesting and important questions regarding today’s constitutional realities. This is particularly true when it comes to de jure constitutional design. Why do de jure constitutions matter? Can they be designed such that they are robust? When they are not robust, does constitutional drift lead to a better or worse governance environment? In discussing these questions, I attempt to point Austrian scholars towards some potentially fruitful CPE research avenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:32:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s11138-019-00482-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-019-00482-9
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    Cited by:

    1. Tarabar, Danko & Young, Andrew T., 2021. "What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    2. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    3. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2022. "Does rigidity matter? Constitutional entrenchment and growth," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 27-62, February.
    4. Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
    5. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    6. Justin T. Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2024. "Revolutionary Constitutions: are they revolutionary in terms of constitutional design?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 423-455, September.

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