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Political Property Rights and Governance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity

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  • Alexander William Salter

    (Texas Tech University)

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  • Alexander William Salter, 2016. "Political Property Rights and Governance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 1-20.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1318
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Adam Martin & Diana Thomas, 2013. "Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 21-37, January.
    2. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(3), pages 467-482, September.
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    4. Mieszkowski, Peter & Zodrow, George R, 1989. "Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1098-1146, September.
    5. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Sovereignty as exchange of political property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 79-96, October.
    7. Leeson,Peter T., 2014. "Anarchy Unbound," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107629707, September.
    8. Boettke, Peter & Coyne, Christopher, 2011. "The debt-inflation cycle and the global financial crisis," MPRA Paper 32091, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. David Emanuel Andersson & Stefano Moroni (ed.), 2014. "Cities and Private Planning," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15788.
    10. Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner, 2013. "Tax Prices in a Democratic Polity: The Continuing Relevance of Antonio de Viti de Marco," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 99-121, Spring.
    11. Gordon Tullock, 1975. "The Transitional Gains Trap," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 671-678, Autumn.
    12. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    13. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 375-390, September.
    14. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, October.
    15. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    16. Alexander W. Salter & Abigail R. Hall, 2015. "Calculating Bandits: Quasi-Corporate Governance and Institutional Selection in Autocracies," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: New Thinking in Austrian Political Economy, volume 19, pages 193-213, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    17. Caplan, Bryan, 2003. "The idea trap: the political economy of growth divergence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 183-203, June.
    18. Richard E. Wagner, 2016. "Politics as a Peculiar Business," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16989.
    19. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
    20. Salter, Alexander William, 2015. "Rights to the Realm: Reconsidering Western Political Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 725-734, November.
    21. Stringham, Edward Peter, 2015. "Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199365166.
    22. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, September.
    23. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
    24. Richard E. Wagner, 2007. "Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12713.
    25. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    26. Fred E. Foldvary, 1994. "Public Goods And Private Communities," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 167.
    27. Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Government, clubs, and constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 301-308.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Makovi, 2019. "Government vs. Governance: Libertarianism and Private Communities," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 39-57.
    2. Alexander W. Craig & Nathan Goodman, 2019. "Social Capital and Social Justice: Why Liberalism Is Essential," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 59-73.
    3. Peter J. Boettke & Rosolino A. Candela, 2020. "Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 331-352, March.
    4. John Garen, 2020. "The Allocation and Exchange of Property Rights as a Way to Understand Comparative Economic Systems and Managerial Economics," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Winter 20), pages 43-59.
    5. Robert A. Lawson & Ryan Murphy & Benjamin Powell, 2020. "The Determinants Of Economic Freedom: A Survey," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 622-642, October.
    6. Alexander William Salter, 2016. "Post-Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 294-308, October.
    7. Bryan P. Cutsinger, 2019. "The Durability of Legislative Benefits and the Role of the Executive Branch’s Settlement Authority," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 1-14.
    8. Ryan H. Murphy, 2019. "Governance and the dimensions of autocracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 131-148, June.
    9. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Sovereignty as exchange of political property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 79-96, October.

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