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A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries

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  • Tsebelis, George
  • Nardi, Dominic J.

Abstract

This article starts with two empirical observations from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries about longer constitutions: (1) they are more rigid (that is, more difficult to amend) and (2) they are in practice more frequently amended. The study presents models of the frequently adopted rules for constitutional revision (for example, qualified majorities in one or two chambers, referendums) and demonstrates that, if longer constitutions are more frequently revised, it is because they must impose actual harm on overwhelming majorities. In trying to explain this finding, the article demonstrates that longer constitutions tend to contain more substantive restrictions. Countries with longer constitutions also tend to have lower levels of GDP per capita and higher corruption. Finally, the negative effect of constitutional length on GDP per capita is shown to persist even if corruption is controlled for.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsebelis, George & Nardi, Dominic J., 2016. "A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 457-478, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:46:y:2016:i:02:p:457-478_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Urbatsch, R., 2020. "Do expert surveys underrate lower-income countries?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(8).
    2. Hans Gersbach & Philippe Muller & Oriol Tejada, 2017. "A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 17/270, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    3. Tarabar, Danko & Young, Andrew T., 2021. "What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    4. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    5. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
    6. Nabamita Dutta & Saibal Kar & Israt Jahan, 2024. "Environmental policy implementation, gender, and corruption," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 257-290, June.
    7. Justin T. Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2024. "Revolutionary Constitutions: are they revolutionary in terms of constitutional design?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 423-455, September.
    8. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2022. "Does rigidity matter? Constitutional entrenchment and growth," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 27-62, February.
    9. David Ahnen & Peter T, Calcagno, 2019. "Constitutions and Social Trust: An Analysis of the US States," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Fall 2019), pages 11-33.

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