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Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations

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  • Alexander William Salter
  • Andrew T. Young

Abstract

Objective It is widely accepted that good institutions caused modern economic prosperity. But what caused good institutions? In this article we challenge recent explanations that favor state capacity, pointing instead to the polycentric governance structures of medieval Europe. Methods We develop a novel theory of constitutions, which we call “polycentric sovereignty,” based on political property rights. We use this theory to reinterpret the historical evidence concerning the relationship between the medieval patrimony and good governance. Results Our analysis suggests the de facto balance of power among the “owners of the realm” in medieval Europe are crucial in explaining the rise of pro‐growth institutions, especially those that respect and uphold the rule of law. Conclusion Medieval institutions set the background conditions for good governance. We cannot understand the bounty of economic modernity without reference to the received political‐economic traditions from medieval Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2019. "Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1241-1253, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:100:y:2019:i:4:p:1241-1253
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12619
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
    4. Tarabar, Danko & Young, Andrew T., 2021. "What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    5. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2022. "Does rigidity matter? Constitutional entrenchment and growth," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 27-62, February.
    6. Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
    7. Vincent Geloso, 2022. "Statogenic climate change? Julian Simon and Institutions," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 343-358, September.
    8. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2018. "Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 171-192, June.
    9. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2020. "Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 133-186, June.
    10. Andrew Young, 2022. "The Peace of God," Rationality and Society, , vol. 34(1), pages 28-55, February.

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