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What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture?

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  • Tarabar, Danko
  • Young, Andrew T.

Abstract

Why are some constitutions amended frequently and others hardly at all? An obvious candidate determinant is constitutional rigidity, i.e., the size and number of procedural barriers to amendment. Given some demand for amendment, greater rigidity implies a smaller supply. However, measures of rigidity often do not correlate significantly (or even with the predicted sign) with amendment rates. Ginsburg and Melton (2015) argue that amendment culture – “shared attitudes about the desirability of amendment” – is a more important determinant of amendment rates. We study up to 128 constitutional episodes from 54 countries and estimate relationships between amendment rates and Hofstede cultural indices. Cultures that are more individualistic and less prone to uncertainty avoidance are associated with higher amendment rates. When cultural dimensions are controlled for, the lagged amendment rate (Ginsburg and Melton’s proxy for culture) is not a robust correlate.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarabar, Danko & Young, Andrew T., 2021. "What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020301014
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101953
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutions; Constitutional amendments; Constitutional rigidity; Constitutional design; Culture; Hofstede indices;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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