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Hospitalitas: Barbarian settlements and constitutional foundations of medieval Europe

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  • YOUNG, ANDREW T.

Abstract

A rough balance of political power between monarchs and a militarized landed aristocracy characterized medieval Western Europe. Scholars have argued that this balance of power contributed to a tradition of limited government and constitutional bargaining. I argue that 5th- and 6th-century barbarian settlements created a foundation for this balance of power. The settlements provided barbarians with allotments of lands or taxes due from the lands. The allotments served to align the incentives of barbarian warriors and Roman landowners, and realign the incentives of barbarian warriors and their leadership elite. Barbarian military forces became decentralized and the warriors became political powerful shareholders of the realm.

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  • Young, Andrew T., 2018. "Hospitalitas: Barbarian settlements and constitutional foundations of medieval Europe," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 715-737, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:14:y:2018:i:04:p:715-737_00
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    1. Salter, Alexander William & Young, Andrew T., 2018. "A theory of self-enforcing monetary constitutions with reference to the Suffolk System, 1825–1858," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 13-22.
    2. Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
    3. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, January.
    4. Lia Pricope (Sabou) & Sorin Nicolae Borlea, 2023. "Impact Oftax Burden Upon Tax Fraudand Tax Evasion," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 2(25), pages 1-22.

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