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Government, clubs, and constitutions

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  • Leeson, Peter T.

Abstract

This paper analyzes “constitutional effectiveness” – the degree to which constitutions can be enforced – in the system of government vs. the system of clubs. I argue that clubs have residual claimants on revenues generated through constitutional compliance, operate in a highly competitive environment, and permit individuals to sort themselves according to their governance needs. These features make their constitutional contracts self-enforcing. Government lacks these features. So its constitutional contract is not. Institutional augmentations that make government more club-like, such as federalism, democracy, and limited government scope, improve government's constitutional effectiveness. But constitutional effectiveness remains superior in the system of clubs.

Suggested Citation

  • Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Government, clubs, and constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 301-308.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:2:p:301-308
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Buchanan; Government; Clubs; Constitution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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