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Emergent politics and constitutional drift: the fragility of procedural liberalism

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Salter
  • Glenn Furton

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to integrate classical elite theory into theories of constitutional bargains. Design/methodology/approach - Qualitative methods/surveys/case studies. Findings - Open-ended constitutional entrepreneurship cannot be forestalled. Constitutional entrepreneurs will almost always be social elites. Research limitations/implications - The research yields a toolkit for analysing constitutional bargains. It needs to be used in historical settings to acquire greater empirical content. Need to be applied to concrete historical cases to do economic history. Right now it is still only institutionally contingent theory. Practical implications - Formal constitutions do not, and cannot, bind. Informal constitutions can, but they are continually evolving due to elite pressure group behaviors. Social implications - Liberalism needs another method to institutionalize itself! Originality/value - Open-ended nature of constitutional bargaining overlooked in orthodox institutional entrepreneurship/constitutional economics literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Salter & Glenn Furton, 2018. "Emergent politics and constitutional drift: the fragility of procedural liberalism," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 7(1), pages 34-50, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:jepppp:jepp-d-17-00016
    DOI: 10.1108/JEPP-D-17-00016
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 808-830, October.
    3. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
    4. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    5. Glenn L. Furton, 2023. "The pox of politics: Troesken’s tradeoff reexamined," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 169-191, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional bargain; Elite theory; Formal constitution; Informal constitution; Politics as exchange; Procedural liberalism; B5; H11; H83; P14; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B5 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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