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Bank Pay Caps, Bank Risk, and Macroprudential Regulation

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  • John Thanassoulis

Abstract

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets onbank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks' riskand raise banks' values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market.The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1increase. The cap encourages diversi cation and reduces the need a bank has to focus ona limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulationto encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail bankingsector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remunerationwould have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra tier 1 for UBS, forexample.

Suggested Citation

  • John Thanassoulis, 2012. "Bank Pay Caps, Bank Risk, and Macroprudential Regulation," Economics Series Working Papers 636, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:636
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Larry D. Wall, 2020. "Is stricter regulation of incentive compensation the missing piece?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(1), pages 82-94, March.
    2. Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi & Yuan, Xuchuan, 2015. "Bonus caps, deferrals and bankers' risk-taking," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2015, Bank of Finland.
    3. Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi & Yuan, Xuchuan, 2015. "Bonus caps, deferrals and bankers' risk-taking," Research Discussion Papers 5/2015, Bank of Finland.
    4. D’Orazio, Paola & Popoyan, Lilit, 2019. "Fostering green investments and tackling climate-related financial risks: Which role for macroprudential policies?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 25-37.
    5. Mourouzidou-Damtsa, Stella & Milidonis, Andreas & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos, 2019. "National culture and bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 132-143.
    6. Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2018. "Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 206-242, April.
    7. repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201503041096 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201503041096 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Jarque, Arantxa & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2020. "Banker compensation, relative performance, and bank risk," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    10. Pedro Gete & Juan-Pedro Gómez, 2018. "Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 1-29, March.
    11. Pedro Gete & Juan Pedro Gómez, 2017. "Executive compensation and firm leverage. A policy oriented survey," Financial Stability Review, Banco de España, issue Spring.
    12. Jeong-Bon Kim & Li Li & Mary L. Z. Ma & Frank M. Song, 2013. "CEO Option Compensation, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry," Working Papers 182013, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    13. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2015_005 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Abudy, Menachem (Meni) & Amiram, Dan & Rozenbaum, Oded & Shust, Efrat, 2020. "Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Indications from a quasi-natural experiment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    15. Gete, Pedro & Gómez, Juan-Pedro, 2015. "Compensation contracts and fire sales," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 154-171.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Remuneration; compensation; bonuses; capital conservation; systemic bank risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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