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Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent

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Abstract

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firm-level coinsurance is no longer feasible, but managers may self-insure by switching employer to delay the revelation of their true quality. However this results in inefficient project assignment, with low-quality managers handling too risky projects. The model has several empirical predictions and policy implications.

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  • Viral Acharya & Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2012. "Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent," CSEF Working Papers 312, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 07 May 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:312
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    short-termism; long-term risk; managerial turnover; mobility; competition; executive compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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