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On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choice

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  • Otto Davis
  • Melvin Hinich

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  • Otto Davis & Melvin Hinich, 1968. "On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 59-72, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:5:y:1968:i:1:p:59-72
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718684
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1967. "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(2), pages 256-270.
    2. Garvey, Gerald, 1966. "The Theory of Party Equilibrium," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 29-38, March.
    3. Riker, William H., 1961. "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 900-911, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Jackson, 2014. "Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 197-218, April.
    2. J. -L. Migue, 1976. "Le marché politique au Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 2(1), pages 78-90, Winter.
    3. J. Davis & Louis Zincone, 1971. "A linear programming approach to the economic theory of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 61-72, September.
    4. Judith Sloss, 1973. "Stable outcomes in majority rule voting games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 19-48, June.
    5. Fei Xu & Yong Jiang, 2013. "Nash Equilibria on Soft Information Control Games--Based on Banking Industry in China," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(1), pages 84-92, January.
    6. Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger, 1992. "A Spatial Theory of Ideology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 5-30, January.
    7. Melvin Hinich & Michael Munger, 2006. "In memoriam: Otto “Toby” Davis, 1934–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 357-359, September.
    8. Charles Plott, 2012. "Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and The Calculus of Consent," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 293-298, September.
    9. D Austen-Smith, 1983. "The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 1(4), pages 439-460, December.
    10. Mark M. Berger & Michael C. Munger & Richard F. Potthoff, 2000. "The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 228-240, April.
    11. Michael Munger, 2005. "Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 115-133, July.
    12. Norman Schofield, 1980. "Formal political theory," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 249-275, January.
    13. Tanner, Thomas Cole, 1994. "The spatial theory of elections: an analysis of voters' predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space," ISU General Staff Papers 1994010108000018174, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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