IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/wisagr/12625.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Hijackers and Hostages in Non-Binding Linked-Issues Referenda: Analysis and an Application

Author

Listed:
  • Goeschl, Timo

Abstract

Non-binding referenda ('petitions') are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle. This paper analyses a particular form of petitions, so-called linked-issues petitions, which have been described as an 'abuse of direct democracy'. It discusses the use of linked petitions by petition initiators, its take-up by voters in terms of volume and voter motives, and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in Austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and Eastern enlargement of the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Goeschl, Timo, 2003. "Hijackers and Hostages in Non-Binding Linked-Issues Referenda: Analysis and an Application," Staff Papers 12625, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:wisagr:12625
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12625
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12625/files/stpap466.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.12625?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
    2. Fort, Rodney & Bunn, Douglas N, 1998. "Whether One Votes and How One Votes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 51-62, April.
    3. Gordon Tullock, 1967. "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(2), pages 256-270.
    4. Susan Feigenbaum & Lynn Karoly & David Levy, 1988. "When votes are words not deeds: Some evidence from the Nuclear Freeze Referendum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 201-216, September.
    5. Pashigian, B Peter, 1985. "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-interests Are Being Protected?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(4), pages 551-584, October.
    6. Rodney Fort & Douglas Bunn, 1998. "Whether one votes and how one votes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 51-62, April.
    7. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
    8. Sayeed R. Mehmood & Daowei Zhang, 2001. "A Roll Call Analysis of the Endangered Species Act Amendments," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 501-512.
    9. Mark Burkey & Garey Durden, 1998. "The Political Economy of Clean Air Legislation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(2), pages 119-134, March.
    10. Charles Perrings & Bruce Hannon, 2001. "An Introduction to Spatial Discounting," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 23-38, February.
    11. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Timo Goeschl, 2005. "Non-binding linked-issues referenda: Analysis and an application," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 249-266, September.
    2. Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December.
    3. Martorana, Marco F. & Mazza, Isidoro, 2012. "Adaptive voting: an empirical analysis of participation and choice," MPRA Paper 36165, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Stefano Carattini & Andrea Baranzini & Philippe Thalmann & Frédéric Varone & Frank Vöhringer, 2017. "Green Taxes in a Post-Paris World: Are Millions of Nays Inevitable?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(1), pages 97-128, September.
    5. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
    6. Robert Lowry, 1998. "Religion and the demand for membership in environmental citizen groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 223-240, March.
    7. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1992. "Transformations of the commodity space, behavioral heterogeneity, and the aggregation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-35.
    8. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    9. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
    10. Roberts, Kevin, 2015. "Dynamic voting in clubs," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 320-335.
    11. Tobias Streicher & Sascha L. Schmidt & Dominik Schreyer, 2019. "Referenda on Hosting the Olympics: What Drives Voter Turnout?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(5), pages 627-653, June.
    12. Sanne Zwart, 2007. "Fixing the Quorum: Representation versus Abstention," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/07, European University Institute.
    13. Dalibor Roháč, 2009. "Je predpoklad voličskej racionality len mýtus? [Is the assumption of voters' rationality just a myth?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(2), pages 163-176.
    14. Artale, Angelo & Gruner, Hans Peter, 2000. "A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 20-40, October.
    15. Peter A. Zaleski & Penny Maier Donati, 2000. "Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(5), pages 415-427, September.
    16. Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.
    17. Alesina, Alberto & Passarelli, Francesco, 2014. "Regulation versus taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 147-156.
    18. Gebhard Kirchgässner & Tobias Schulz, 2005. "Expected Closeness or Mobilisation: Why Do Voters Go to the Polls? Empirical Results for Switzerland, 1981 – 1999," CESifo Working Paper Series 1387, CESifo.
    19. Daowei Zhang & David Laband, 2005. "From Senators to the President: Solve the lumber problem or else," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 393-410, June.
    20. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:wisagr:12625. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dauwius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.