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Five Questions: An Integrated Research Agenda for Public Choice

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  • Munger, Michael C

Abstract

All societies, political or academic, must choose among alternatives; these choices can be good, or bad. The worst choice may be looking for "answers" before there is consensus, or at least a debate, on what the real questions should be. Five "real" questions are offered here, in an integrated research agenda for Public Choice. My premise is that there is a single, fundamental human problem: Construct or preserve institutions that make self-interested individual action not inconsistent with group welfare. All social science research is either a distraction, or a step toward understanding at least one of five questions. (1) What are preferences? (2) What are feasible alternatives? (3) How much does the form of implementation affect the way alternatives are valued? (4) How do alternatives chosen today affect the menu of alternatives available in the future? (5) What is good? How would we know if some outcomes are better than others? Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Munger, Michael C, 2000. "Five Questions: An Integrated Research Agenda for Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 1-12, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:103:y:2000:i:1-2:p:1-12
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Munger, 2006. "Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 131-146, July.
    2. Cristina Bicchieri, 2002. "Covenants without Swords," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(2), pages 192-228, May.
    3. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
    4. Michael Munger, 2010. "Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 263-268, June.
    5. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 2007. "Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 91-110, September.

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