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Dynamic voting in clubs

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  • Roberts, Kevin

Abstract

This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberts, Kevin, 1999. "Dynamic voting in clubs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19349, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:19349
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19349/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperatives; local public goods; majority voting; median voter; organization size; partnerships; trade unions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing

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