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A Spatial Theory of Ideology

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  • Melvin J. Hinich
  • Michael C. Munger

Abstract

In the spatial model of politics voters choose the candidates closest to them in weighted Euclidean distance, and candidates seek to compete by positioning and repositioning themselves in and n-dimensional policy space. This model has recently come under attack from a number of scholars who assert its depiction of politics is unrealistic. Still these critiques retain the character of the original model. We offer a more radical alternative: an explicitly neo-Downsian spatial model of ideology specifying the linkage between ideological messages and policy positions. After indicating the importance of ideology as a theory, a formula depiction is offered and an illustrative empirical application is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger, 1992. "A Spatial Theory of Ideology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 5-30, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:5-30
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692892004001001
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    1. Pál Czeglédi, 2020. "The consistency of market beliefs as a determinant of economic freedom," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 227-258, June.
    2. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 5-29, March.
    3. Jordan Rappaport, 1997. "Extremist Funding, Centrist Voters, and Candidate Divergence," Research in Economics 97-06-059e, Santa Fe Institute.
    4. Sugato Dasgupta & Kenneth C. Williams, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Novice Incumbents," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 409-438, October.
    5. López, Fernando & Rosas, Guillermo, 2022. "COVID-19 and attitudes towards early withdrawal of pension funds: The role of trust and political ideology," The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Elsevier, vol. 23(C).
    6. Daniel L. Bennett & Christopher Boudreaux & Boris Nikolaev, 2023. "Populist discourse and entrepreneurship: The role of political ideology and institutions," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 54(1), pages 151-181, February.
    7. William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, 1993. "Doing Well While Intending Good: Cases in Political Exploitation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 317-348, July.
    8. Enriqueta Aragonés & Zvika Neeman, 1994. "Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition," Economics Working Papers 162, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 1996.
    9. David Yi, 2007. "Election campaign resource allocation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 91-105, October.

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