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Examining the public interest rationale for regulating whiskey with the pure food and drugs act

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  • Daniel J. Smith

    (Jones College of Business at Middle Tennessee State University)

  • Macy Scheck

    (Jones College of Business at Middle Tennessee State University)

Abstract

Was there legitimate public interest justification for regulating whiskey with the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906? High and Coppin (Bus Hist Rev 62:286–309, 1988) provide evidence for a public choice interpretation of the application of the act to the whiskey industry. However, the existence of public choice factors does not preclude the simultaneous existence of genuine public interest rationales. The public interest justification was that rectifiers, who flavored neutral spirits to replicate straight whiskey, commonly adulterated whiskey with poisonous ingredients. We examine these claims using alcohol consumption data, chemical tests of whiskey, trade book recipes, and reported deaths and poisonings from whiskey. We find that poisons were infrequently used in rectified whiskey and that the poisons used were overwhelmingly either not fully understood to be dangerous at that time or were demanded in underground markets. The historical evidence bolsters the public choice interpretation of High and Coppin (1988).

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel J. Smith & Macy Scheck, 2023. "Examining the public interest rationale for regulating whiskey with the pure food and drugs act," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 85-122, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:196:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01061-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01061-0
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public choice; Public interest; Whiskey; Pure Food and Drugs Act;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • N81 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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