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The political economy of lighthouses in antebellum America

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  • Callais, Justin T
  • Geloso, Vincent

Abstract

The study of the lighthouse features prominently in debates over the private provision of public services. However, little attention has been devoted to how lighthouse systems operated once governments took charge of its production. We exploit the fact that Antebellum America came close to the ideal textbook solution to providing public goods and we assess how the government allocated lighthouses before the Civil War. We find some evidence that the lighthouses were built according to commercial needs. However, we discover stronger evidence that political considerations played a role in selecting where lighthouses would be built.

Suggested Citation

  • Callais, Justin T & Geloso, Vincent, 2023. "The political economy of lighthouses in antebellum America," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000545
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104425
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lighthouse; Public goods; American economic history; Public interest; Public choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N31 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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