IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v136y2008i1p181-200.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits

Author

Listed:
  • Yu-Bong Lai

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu-Bong Lai, 2008. "Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 181-200, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:1:p:181-200
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9290-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-008-9290-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-008-9290-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
    3. Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2002. "Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-existing Distortions," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 26, pages 504-522, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Dewees, Donald N, 1983. "Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(1), pages 53-71, January.
    5. Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 1999. "U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(1-2), pages 109-128, October.
    6. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Environmental Economics," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-54, Resources for the Future.
    7. Markussen, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2005. "Industry lobbying and the political economy of GHG trade in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 245-255, January.
    8. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2003. "Dynamic common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 23-48, July.
    9. Richard A. Posner, 1993. "Ronald Coase and Methodology," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 195-210, Fall.
    10. van Egteren, Henry & Weber, Marian, 1996. "Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 161-173, March.
    11. Hadjikhani, Amjad & Ghauri, Pervez N., 2001. "The behaviour of international firms in socio-political environments in the European Union," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 263-275, June.
    12. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    13. Hahn, Robert W, 1990. "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying Framework," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 21-47, April.
    14. Cropper, Maureen L. & William N. Evans & Stephen J. Berard & Maria M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, 1992. "The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 175-197, February.
    15. Malik, Arun S., 2002. "Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 371-390, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ian A. Lange & Sarah Polborn, 2012. "Can Lobbying Encourage Abatement? Designing a New Policy Instrument," CESifo Working Paper Series 3760, CESifo.
    2. Hanley Nick & MacKenzie Ian A, 2010. "The Effects of Rent Seeking over Tradable Pollution Permits," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, July.
    3. Pauli Lappi, 2021. "Lobbying for size and slice of the quota," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(5), pages 1143-1162, October.
    4. Daubanes, Julien & Lasserre, Pierre, 2019. "Marchés Internationaux de Droits à Polluer et Taxes Locales sur les Biens Polluants," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 95(2-3), pages 269-286, Juin-Sept.
    5. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2013. "Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 219-234.
    6. Chang, Kai & Chang, Hao, 2016. "Cutting CO2 intensity targets of interprovincial emissions trading in China," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 211-221.
    7. Teun Schrieks & Julia Swart & Fujin Zhou & W. J. Wouter Botzen, 2023. "Lobbying, Time Preferences and Emission Tax Policy," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, March.
    8. Sanjay Patnaik, 2020. "Emissions permit allocation and strategic firm behavior: Evidence from the oil sector in the European Union emissions trading scheme," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 976-995, March.
    9. Chu‐chuan Cheng & Hsun Chu, 2020. "International emissions trading in a political economy," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 429-446, May.
    10. Minoru Nakada, 2020. "The impact of environmental tax revenue allocation on the consequence of lobbying activities," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 335-349, December.
    11. Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2022. "Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(1), pages 227-255, May.
    12. Liu, Beibei & He, Pan & Zhang, Bing & Bi, Jun, 2012. "Impacts of alternative allowance allocation methods under a cap-and-trade program in power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 405-415.
    13. Gawel, Erik & Strunz, Sebastian & Lehmann, Paul, 2014. "A public choice view on the climate and energy policy mix in the EU — How do the emissions trading scheme and support for renewable energies interact?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 175-182.
    14. Sonia Schwartz, 2009. "Comment distribuer les quotas de pollution ?. Une revue de la littérature," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(4), pages 535-568.
    15. Lawrence Rothenberg, 2012. "The Political Economy of Climate Change," Chapters, in: Chin Hee Hahn & Sang-Hyop Lee & Kyoung-Soo Yoon (ed.), Responding to Climate Change, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    3. Yu-Bong Lai, 2007. "The Optimal Distribution of Pollution Rights in the Presence of Political Distortions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(3), pages 367-388, March.
    4. Yu-Bong Lai, 2009. "Is a Double Dividend Better than a Single Dividend?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 342-363, June.
    5. Fredriksson, Per G. & Gaston, Noel, 1999. "The "greening" of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 663-686, November.
    6. Yu-Bong Lai, 2019. "The impacts of firms’ mobility on the environmental policy," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(3), pages 349-369, July.
    7. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1996. "Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-07, CIRANO.
    8. Fredriksson, Per G. & Neumayer, Eric & Damania, Richard & Gates, Scott, 2005. "Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 343-365, March.
    9. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
    10. Grey, Felix, 2018. "Corporate lobbying for environmental protection," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 23-40.
    11. Voss, Achim & Schopf, Mark, 2021. "Lobbying over exhaustible-resource extraction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    12. Edwards, Eric C. & Cristi, Oscar & Edwards, Gonzalo & Libecap, Gary D., 2018. "An illiquid market in the desert: estimating the cost of water trade restrictions in northern Chile," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(6), pages 615-634, December.
    13. Isabelle Cadoret & Fabio Padovano, 2018. "Derterminants and consequences of the stringency of environmental policies: an empirical test," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2018-04-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    14. Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
    15. Ioulia Ossokina & Otto Swank, 2008. "Adoption Subsidy Versus Technology Standards Under Asymmetric Information," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 241-267, September.
    16. Pablo Río & Xavier Labandeira, 2009. "Barriers to the introduction of market-based instruments in climate policies: an integrated theoretical framework," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 41-68, March.
    17. Per Fredriksson, 2001. "How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 65-85, April.
    18. Daniel Halbheer & Sarah Niggli & Armin Schmutzler, 2006. "What Does it Take to Sell Environmental Policy? An Empirical Analysis of Referendum Data," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 33(4), pages 441-462, April.
    19. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2016. "Special Interest Politics: Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining," Working Papers Dissertations 27, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    20. Julien A. Hanoteau, 2003. "Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 93(1), pages 289-314, January-F.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auction; Grandfathering; Interest groups; Lobbying; Environmental policy; Tradable emission permits; D72; Q52; Q58;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:1:p:181-200. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.