Dynamic common agency
Author
Abstract
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Discussion Papers 1259, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dirk & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1206, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995.
"Trade Wars and Trade Talks,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Papers 163, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Scholarly Articles 3450062, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275571, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Papers 1-93, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," CEPR Discussion Papers 806, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," NBER Working Papers 4280, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September.
- LAUSSEL, Didier & LE BRETON, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1519, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 1996.
"Learning and Strategic Pricing,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1125-1149, September.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1113, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-942, July.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001.
"Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1799, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1996. "Complements and substitutes in common agency," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 325-345, December.
- David Martimort, 1996.
"Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- Martimort, D., 1992. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery," Papers 92.278, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Martimort, David, 1994. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," IDEI Working Papers 43, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1996.
- Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
- Avinash Dixit, 1996. "Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 375-388, Fall.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September.
- LAUSSEL, Didier & LE BRETON, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1519, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2005.
""Favors" for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection,"
Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, May.
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2005. "Favors for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection," IDEI Working Papers 361, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004.
"Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
- Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Working papers 2000-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002.
- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
- Arribas, I. & Urbano, A., 2017.
"Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 14-38.
- Iván Arribas & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2014. "Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0614, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno, 2019.
"One lab, two firms, many possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 260-283.
- Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno, 2017. "One Lab, Two Firms, Many Possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry," MPRA Paper 76903, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel, 2019. "One Lab, Two Firms, Many Possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry," Post-Print hal-02107357, HAL.
- Bruno Versaevel, 2018. "One lab, two firms, many Possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry," Post-Print halshs-01960426, HAL.
- Bruno Versaevel, 2018. "One lab, two firms, many Possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry," Post-Print halshs-01960435, HAL.
- Conconi, Paola, 2003.
"Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 399-422, March.
- Paola Conconi, 2003. "Green Lobbies and Transboundary Pollution in Large Open Economies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5837, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003.
"Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, July.
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 1999. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," IDEI Working Papers 110, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," CESifo Working Paper Series 581, CESifo.
- Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998.
"Exclusive Dealing,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, "undated". "Exclusive Dealing," Working Papers 96008, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1996. "Exclusive Dealing," NBER Working Papers 5666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernheim, B.D., 1992. "Exclusive Dealing," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1622, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Martimort, David, 2019.
""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2020. "“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making," Post-Print halshs-02875061, HAL.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2020. "“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02875061, HAL.
- V. Bhaskar & Nikita Roketskiy, 2021.
"Consumer privacy and serial monopoly,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 917-944, December.
- V. Bhaskar & Nikita Roketskiy, 2019. "Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly," Papers 1904.07644, arXiv.org.
- Roketskiy, Nikita & Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2019. "Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 13686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco H.G., 2007.
"Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 993-1021, June.
- Filipe Campante & Francisco H. G. Ferreira, "undated". "Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy," Working Paper 248211, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Campante, Felipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco G.H., 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3240, The World Bank.
- Francisco H. G. Ferreira & Filipe Campante, 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Textos para discussão 483, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
- Campante, Filipe Robin & Ferreira, Francisco H.G., 2007. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Scholarly Articles 24865281, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Uk Hwang & Francesco Magris, 2005.
"Intergenerational Conflicts and the Resource Policy Formation of a Short-Lived Government,"
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 141(III), pages 437-457, September.
- Uk Hwang & Francesco Magris, 2004. "Intergenerational Conflicts and the Resource Policy Formation of a Short-Lived Government," Documents de recherche 04-16, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
- Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2006.
"Dynamic price competition,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 232-263, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2003. "Dynamic Price Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1412, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2004. "Dynamic Price Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm360, Yale School of Management.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2010.
"Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 21-33, September.
- D’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2005. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2010. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2238, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Claude, D’ASPREMONT & Rodolphe, DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, 2005. "Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
- Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:111:y:2003:i:1:p:23-48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.