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The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons

Author

Listed:
  • Neil J. Buckley

    (York University)

  • Stuart Mestelman

    (McMaster University)

  • R. Andrew Muller

    (McMaster University)

  • Stephan Schott

    (Carleton University)

  • Jingjing Zhang

    (University of Technology Sydney)

Abstract

Organizing individual appropriators into output sharing groups has been found to effectively solve the tragedy of the commons problem. We experimentally investigate the robustness of this solution by introducing different channels of communication that naturally arise from group competitions. In the absence of communication, we confirm that output sharing can introduce sufficient free riding to offset over-harvesting and results in full efficiency. Allowing local communication within output-sharing groups substantially decreases this efficiency enhancement because it reduces free riding and boosts between-group competition. Yet the efficiency level is still significantly higher than that achieved when global communication is allowed among all appropriators in a conventional common pool resource without output sharing. The efficiency-reducing effect of local communication is mitigated when random partners instead of fixed partners are sharing output over time, and is nearly eliminated when random partners are formed with users who belong to different communication groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Neil J. Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephan Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2018. "The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 363-380, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:70:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0124-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-017-0124-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Chao, Hong & Ho, Chun-Yu & Huang, Shaoqing & Qin, Xiangdong & Cong, Jiajia, 2019. "Partners or rivals? An experimental study of a two-stage tournament," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 288-310.
    4. Neil Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephen Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2017. "Do the Number of Appropriators from the Commons Matter in Controlled Laboratory Environments?," Department of Economics Working Papers 2017-09, McMaster University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common pool resources; Output sharing; Partnership solution; Communication; Competition; Group behavior; Partners and strangers; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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