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Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction

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  • Andrew Muller
  • Michelle Vickers

Abstract

We replicate and extend an experiment due to Walker and Gardner by investigating the effect of communication in a common pool resource subject to probabilistic destruction when group appropriation exceeds a safe zone. We replicate the Gardner and Walker result that destruction of the resource is rapid and efficiencies are low when communication is not allowed. Face-to-face communication significantly increases mean efficiency. Three groups of five sustain a “good” Nash equilibrium in the safe zone. The remaining two groups quickly destroy the resource. Achieving a “good”equilibrium is highly dependent on the emergence of a leader in the group communication.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Muller & Michelle Vickers, 1996. "Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction," Department of Economics Working Papers 1996-06, McMaster University.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1996-06
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    File URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/McMasterEconWP1996-06.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
    2. Walker, James M & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1149-1161, September.
    3. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    4. Anthony Scott, 1955. "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 116-116.
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    Cited by:

    1. P. Tamuno & G. Howard & M. Smith, 2009. "River use profile of the Central Niger Delta based on traditional eco-livelihood knowledge (TELK)," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 887-903, August.
    2. Kenneth Chan & Stuart Mestelman & Robert Moir & R. Muller, 1999. "Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(1), pages 5-30, August.
    3. Neil J. Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephan Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2013. "Communication and Output Sharing in Common Pool Resource Environments," Department of Economics Working Papers 2013-06, McMaster University.
    4. Vollan, Bjørn, 2008. "Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 560-573, November.
    5. Neil J. Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephan Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2010. "Effort provision and communication in teams competing over the commons," IEW - Working Papers 503, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Bodo Sturm & Joachim Weimann, 2006. "Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 419-457, July.
    7. Werthmann, Christine & Weingart, Anne & Kirk, Michael, 2010. "Common-pool resources-a challenge for local governance: Experimental research in eight villages in the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam," CAPRi working papers 98, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    8. Vollan, Bjorn & Prediger, Sebastian & Frolich, Markus, 2010. "The influence of collective property rights on grazing management in a semi-arid region," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 5(2), pages 1-30, December.
    9. Oses-Eraso, Nuria & Viladrich-Grau, Montserrat, 2007. "Appropriation and concern for resource scarcity in the commons: An experimental study," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2-3), pages 435-445, August.
    10. Neil J. Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephan Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2018. "The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 363-380, June.
    11. César A.Salazar & Mauricio G.Villena, 2005. "Evolución de preferencias bajo escenarios de información completa e incompleta: teoría y evidencia experimental," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 32(2 Year 20), pages 159-186, December.
    12. Neil Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephan Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Shut Up and Fish: The Role of Communication when Output-Sharing is used to Manage a Common Pool Resource," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-15, McMaster University.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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