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Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness

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  • R. Isaac
  • Deborah Mathieu
  • Edward Zajac

Abstract

This paper's goal is to construct a positive theory of economic fairness. Using the theoretical schema developed by Hurwicz and others, the paper makes precise the notions of an “institution,” “fairness fraiming,” and “institutional framing.” Four fairness propositions yield an important corollary: the economic environment, the operative institution and history give meaning to the often used FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (“equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequellay, in proportion to relevant similarities and differences”). We support these four propositions and corollary by an analysis of laboratory, survey, and anecdotal evidence. Finally we describe a number of areas for future research. Copyright George Mason University 1991

Suggested Citation

  • R. Isaac & Deborah Mathieu & Edward Zajac, 1991. "Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 329-370, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:2:y:1991:i:3:p:329-370
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393135
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    7. Elliott, Catherine S. & Hayward, Donald M., 1998. "The expanding definition of framing and its particular impact on economic experimentation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 229-243.
    8. Ekkehart Schlicht, 2008. "Consistency in Organization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(4), pages 612-623, December.
    9. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S., 1999. "The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
    10. Schotter, Andrew & Weiss, Avi & Zapater, Inigo, 1996. "Fairness and survival in ultimatum and dictatorship games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 37-56, October.
    11. Kakizawa, Hisanobu, 2017. "The value of punishment of free riders: A case study on the receiving fee system of the Japanese public broadcasting organization," 14th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Kyoto 2017: Mapping ICT into Transformation for the Next Information Society 168496, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    12. Neuteleers, Stijn & Mulder, Machiel & Hindriks, Frank, 2017. "Assessing fairness of dynamic grid tariffs," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 111-120.
    13. James Konow, 2000. "Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1072-1091, September.
    14. Mia Reinholt Fosgaard & Toke Reinholt Fosgaard & Nicolai Juul Foss, 2017. "Consumer or citizen? Prosocial behaviors in markets and non-markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 231-253, August.
    15. Elliott, Catherine S. & Hayward, Donald M. & Canon, Sebastian, 1998. "Institutional framing: Some experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 455-464, May.
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    20. Frey, Bruno S. & Meier, Stephan, 2004. "Pro-social behavior in a natural setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 65-88, May.

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